REPUBLIC OF RWANDA

NATIONAL UNITY AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

RWANDA RECONCILIATION BAROMETER

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ACRONYMS

CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
FARG	Fonds d'Assistance aux rescapés du Génocide
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
IJR	Institute for Justice and Reconciliation
IRDP	Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace
MINALOC	Ministry of Local Administration
NURC	National Unity and Reconciliation Commission
PSGG	Programme to Strengthen Good Governance
RPF	Rwandese Patriotic Front
RRB	Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer
SARB	South African Reconciliation Barometer
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
US$	United States of America Dollar

N.B: USE OF "ETHNIC GROUPS" TERMINOLOGY

This terminology has been used to refer to Hutu, Tutsi and Twa   but, on scientific basis, Hutu, Tutsi and Twa in Rwanda are not ethnic groups.

FOREWORD

For more than sixteen years, Rwanda has been and is still embarking on the way of reconciliation after many decades of divisionism which culminated into the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi. Even though our past tragedy has passed, Rwandans have to heal the wounds of the past. They have to do more in rebuilding the needed social cohesion and the recommendable human being under supportive good governance.

Given the situation where the country is coming from characterized by a collapsed society and state, we needed for long time to measure in the appropriate manner the on going process of unity and reconciliation in order to evaluate and focus to main challenges if any. On this note, the Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer (RRB) is addressing that issue as a measurement tool that is assessing the progress in the field of the Reconciliation in Rwanda.

Variables in relation with reconciliation have been identified and extended to related indicators which have enabled the drawing of a comprehensive questionnaire that was submitted to a sampled population. The research findings are very recommendable with some gaps to fill given the fact that the Reconciliation is a process which was started and still on going.

We have achieved a lot but we have not yet reached the desired level. For such reasons, Rwandans need to speed up the building of a prosperous and peaceful country. What we have achieved in the last sixteen years must energize us to go further in cleaning up the understanding and the behaviors which could be a barrier of unity and reconciliation among Rwandans.

We are witnessing that Rwanda is in a new era, making new records of togetherness, mutual respect and complementarity. The Miss interpretation and falsification of history that saved to spread divisionism among Rwandans are over. To day Rwandans are proud to be what they are and are in the way to make themselves what they want to be. The unity and reconciliation process has shown recommendable results for which Rwandans are proud of.

GOD bless Rwanda.

Bishop John RUCYAHANA

Chairperson

AKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Dr. Jean Baptiste HABYALIMANA

Executive Secretary of the NURC

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer (RRB) project is in line with the NURC's mandate to promote national unity and reconciliation in a post-genocide Rwanda, and represents an attempt to deepen its understanding of how ordinary citizens perceive and react to efforts aimed at promoting these objectives. The study has emerged from the need for a quantitative monitoring tool that would allow the Commission to access the most current public opinion on the progress and pitfalls of the country's national reconciliation programme. Such a tool would allow it to respond in a more targeted way to social fault lines and, in the longer term, may serve as an early warning system to potential sources of societal friction. Public opinion around national reconciliation has, thus far, been an under-researched aspect in the search to understand national unity and reconciliation processes in Rwanda, and this report presents the results of exploratory research on this area.

Inspired from, among others,the conceptual framework and methodology of the South African Reconciliation Barometer (SARB), which has measured public opinion on national reconciliation in that country since 2003, the Rwandan Reconciliation Barometer (RBB) is a national public opinion survey that intends to track progress on the road to reconciliation in Rwanda by means of a structured quantitative research instrument. The survey consisted of face-to-face interviews with approximately three thousand Rwandan citizens, across all thirty districts of the country, to represent a sampling universe of all citizens who have reached the legal age of majority (approximately 4,963,000 adults). Due to the unavailability of population data on the district level following territorial reforms, the project employed a multi-stage probability sampling methodology. Sampling stratification was conducted across different levels: district; sector; cell; village; household; and according to gender (by ensuring that every second interview was conducted with a woman). A quantitative data collection approach was used, through the form of face-to-face interviews administered in Kinyarwanda based on a structured questionnaire.

In preparation the research team, through a series of consultations with experts inside and outside of Rwanda, distilled six key hypotheses that are critical to the state of- and future prospects for national unity and reconciliation in the country. The hypotheses, their indicators, and public responses to their measurement are summarised below:

1. **Political culture:** The first hypothesis posited that if citizens view political structures, institutions, values and leadership as legitimate and effective, national reconciliation is more likely to occur. Survey questions and statements therefore measured confidence in public institutions, trust in leadership, and the respect of rule of law and courts.

    In brief, the results indicate moderate to high levels (more than 90%) of trust in public institutions overall (compared to generally lower levels of trust in non-governmental and private institutions), in the country's political leadership. The survey also recorded significantly high percentages of respondents who indicated participation or willingness to participate in citizen forums (more than 85%). The major exception to this has been in regard with the willingness to participate in actions closely associated with protest or dispute (less than 50%).

2. **Human security:** The second hypothesis contended that if citizens feel materially, physically, and culturally secure, they will be more willing to commit themselves to national reconciliation processes. This hypothesis is based on the contention that under conditions of scarcity in a society with a history of ethnic friction, conflict is more likely to arise along such ethnic lines. The indicators that were used included: physical security; economic security; equality of treatment and access; freedom of expression; and respondents' hope for the future. Respondents reported relatively high levels of physical and economic security; a majority

felt that great strides have been made in all respects since 1994; and there was significant approval of the overall direction of the country (more than 90% overall). It was, however, evident that positive public evaluation for human security was less emphatic than that for most other hypotheses tested.

3. **Citizenship and identity:** The third hypothesis suggested that in contexts where a shared sense of citizenship and identity, as well as tolerance for diversity exists, national reconciliation is more likely to occur. It explores the indicators of national and individual identity, attitudes regarding citizenship, and the prevalence of shared cultural values. Respondents exhibited a strong preference for a national Rwandan identity (more than 97% overall) and national values, but many participants also incorrectly believed that references to ethnicity or ethnic groups are prohibited by law or instruction in Rwanda. Other identities that respondents were likely to associate with were religious-based, value-based and geographically-based

4. **Understanding the past:** This hypothesis is based on the assumption that if Rwandans are able to confront the sources of historical social divisions, reconciliation is more likely to occur, particularly between those who found themselves on opposing sides during the genocide. The study identified the degree to which a shared understanding of the country's history exists (through the acknowledgement of facts or the truth) as a critical indicator of the extent to which the country is coming to terms with its past. The results show that a considerable majority (87.0%) agreed that in the sixteen years following the genocide, most of the major issues related to its causes and consequences have been frankly discussed and understood.

   However, a significant percentage of respondents (almost 39.9%) believe that there are people in Rwandan society that would still perpetrate acts of genocide if given the opportunity.

5. **Transitional justice:** The fifth hypothesis contends that if parties to conflict are convinced that they got proper justice, there is greater likelihood for reconciliation. This was measured by a range of indicators that are associated with the broader field of transitional justice. Most respondents felt that significant strides were made in terms of the creation of domestic transitional justice measures. As far as the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) is concerned, the survey found that although most Rwandans were aware of its purpose and evaluated it positive (nearly 60%), close to a quarter were not in a position to wage an opinion on its effectiveness.

6. **Social cohesion:** The final hypothesis proposes that if trust increases between Rwandan citizens, and particularly those on different sides of the genocide, reconciliation is more likely to occur. As a result the survey presented respondents with a number of statements and questions relating to social distance, tolerance, and trust. The data suggests that citizens sense significant progress in terms of forging social cohesion in the wake of the 1994 genocide (more than 92% overall). Responses suggest positive development (more thatn 80% overall) in terms of inter-ethnic relations and interactions, as well as the levels of trust that exist between communities that found hemselves on different sides during the genocide.

The report concludes with a discussion of the major findings, policy recommendations, and suggestions for further research. In terms of methodological lessons learned, the immediate context on the pre-election mood was found to be less than ideal, given that the very nature of such campaigns are to sway or reinforce opinions from those citizens may normally hold. In addition, the RBB questionnaire raises a number of sensitive issues that may require supplementary qualitative approach in the form of focus group discussion.

In terms of policy-oriented recommendations, it was evident that even though citizens showed significant levels of confidence and trust in state institutions and political leadership to deliver on their

mandate, responses were more reserved in relation to evaluations relating to human security, and particularly so where it is concerned with respondents' sense of economic security is concerned. Since most forms of social conflict has got economic roots, it is imperative that attention should be paid to this finding. While economic growth and personal economic security may very often be contingent upon the whims of the global economy,

it nevertheless remain incumbent upon the state to guarantee equal access to government resources to all citizens, and to ensure that the country's economic and natural assets are managed transparently so as to avoid any charges of ethnic- or any other sectional form of favouritism.

In conclusion, the RRB instrument has set baseline indicators for future surveys. The results that it has rendered should, as a result, also be regarded as baseline findings that do not point to an improvement or decline in the evaluation of the particular indicators. This can only be done when subsequent surveys are being compared against this first round. The report, therefore, recommends that the NURC endeavours to ensure a regular update of this instrument in order to track the current, but also new indicators, should emerge. In addition, and as mentioned above, it is recommended that this quantitative data should be supplemented by qualitative approaches, such as focus groups, to further probe the factors that inform these survey responses.

I. INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

From the 1950's through the 1990's, Rwanda came into international focus for a host of reasons, including ongoing conflict, a record of severe human abuses, and the actions of successive governments that seriously violated the rights of citizens with impunity. Dating back to the colonial period, and throughout periods of conflict and regime change, successive governments entrenched deep-set divisions within Rwandan society, particularly along ethnic lines. These divisions were further enforced through the enacting and implementation of dehumanising law and policy, inequality of treatment, and differential access to amenities, basic services and the protection of the state. As a consequence, many Rwandans left the country as refugees, settling in neighbouring states and further abroad.

During the 1990's, Rwanda's political instability and unrest was further exacerbated by the country's high levels of poverty, its tenuous relations within the region, and increased political opposition, both within and outside of the country's borders, culminating in military clashes between the regime of President Juvenal Habyarimana and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF). Although efforts to promote peace and bring an end to armed conflict appeared to be on track with the signing of the 1993 Arusha Peace Accord, this peace proved fleeting. Instead, violence quickly escalated to a massive scale and the final phase of the genocide claimed over a million lives of Tutsi, as well as Hutu who found themselves on the victims' side for number of reasons.

The genocide shred all that was left of the Rwandan social fabric that provided a degree of social cohesion prior to 1994. In its aftermath the country was left with a collapsed system of governance, a highly polarised society characterised by distrust and fear between citizens, and a lack of shared national unity.

Fortunately, this sad chapter in African history is being left behind. With the return of peace, the country's major challenges were firstly, to build its governance infrastructure, but this was highly contingent upon the second challenge, national reconciliation, which was needed to restore national unity and political stability. At the time few were willing to wage their bets on success in surmounting either of these challenges. Yet, when compared to several of its East African neighbours, Rwanda today enjoys a substantial level of political stability. Government has introduced forward–looking reconstruction efforts and has encouraged citizens to take responsibility for shaping and definiting reconciliation and social reconstruction, with an emphasis on bottom-up approaches and development from within the country.

These factors, together with the country's robust economic growth in recent years, suggest that its government and public institutions, such as NURC, have by and large been successful in arresting the major sources of domestic instability.

1.2 PROMOTING NATIONAL UNITY AND RECONCILIATION

Even prior to the 1994 genocide, and with the 1993 signing of the Arusha Peace Accord, national unity and reconciliation have been viewed as requisite priorities for the re-establishment and consolidation of democracy, peace and security, the rule of law, social cohesion and development in Rwanda. As described by the NURC, the "Arusha Peace Accords, signed in August 1993 between the then-government and the Rwandese Patriotic Front, considered Unity and Reconciliation as a process that is fundamental for the stability and development of Rwanda."[1]

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[1] National Unity and Reconciliation Commission. "Unity and Reconciliation: Understanding Unity & Reconciliation Profess 15 Years after Genocide." NURC Review Magazine, p 3.

In light of this reality, in the post-genocide period, the new Rwandan Government put in place a unique assortment of both international and national, home-grown reconciliatory mechanisms. Rwanda possesses one of only two international criminal tribunals established since Nuremberg and Tokyo after World War II (the other being the court for the former Yugoslavia), the efforts of which have contributed substantively to the developing field of International Criminal Law.

Rwanda's efforts to prosecute *genocidaires* are comparable to other cases in which transitional justice approaches prioritised the prosecution of perpetrators of past political atrocities. The Rwandan approach is also consistent with the provisions of the Rome Treaty, which mandates that amnesties amounting to legal impunity are no longer acceptable for crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide. Although the Treaty was only enacted some years after the Rwanda genocide, it has, since its ratification, added momentum to international efforts to prosecute *génocidaires*.[2] Moreover, the United Nations-sponsored International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) has added significantly to international genocide case law and has been the subject of various studies.[3]

As a complement to the activities of its domestic courts, the Rwandan government also established a revamped version of the traditional Gacaca courts in June of 2002, with elected judges and a jury of the defendant's neighbours, to accelerate justice and to unburden a prison system overloaded by an estimated 130,000 alleged genocide perpetrators.[4]

The establishment of the NURC also represented one of Rwanda's principle non-judicial measures to promote reconciliation. With its foundations traceable to Article 24 of the Arusha Peace Accord, in the Protocol of Agreement on Power-Sharing within the Framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the RPF,[5] the formal establishment of the NURC was the outcome of reflection meetings convened by the Presidency in 1998-1999 to discuss a range of issues pertaining to the history of Rwanda and ways forward in the aftermath of genocide. The NURC was formally instituted in Parliament through the passing of law No 03/99 of 12 March 1999, and with the broad mandate of promoting and fostering reconciliation among Rwandans, the NURC has enjoyed political will and support from the highest political levels since its inception.

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[2] See: http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/Rome_Statute_English.pdf.

[3] See for example, Payam Akhavan, 'The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics and Pragmatics of Punishment,' The American Journal of International Law 90 (1996): 501–510; Payam Akhavan, 'Justice and Reconciliation in the Great Lakes Region of Africa: The Contribution of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,' Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 7, 2 (Spring 1997): 338; as well as Oliver Dubois, 'Rwanda's national criminal courts and the International Tribunal,' International Review of the Red Cross 321 (1997): 718; see also International Crisis Group (ICG), 'International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Justice Delayed' (Nairobi, Arusha and Brussels: International Crisis Group, 7 June 2001): 11–12, [Electronic]. Available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/report_archive/A400442_02102001.pdf [9 October 2007]; Alison Des Forges and Timothy Longman, 'Legal responses to genocide in Rwanda', in My Neighbor, My Enemy, ed. Eric Stover and Harvey M. Weinstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 53f; Madeline H. Morris, 'The Trials of Concurrent Jurisdiction: The Case of Rwanda,' Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 7, 2 (Spring 1997): 363; Oomen, 'Justice Mechanisms,' 19. See also Reydams, 'The ICTR Ten Years On,' 977–988; Helena Cobban, 'The Legacies of Collective Violence: The Rwandan genocide and the limits of law,' Boston Review 7, 2 (April/May 2002) [Electronic]. Available at: www.bostonreview.net/BR27.2/cobban.html [April 2008].

[4] Tiemessen, A.E., 2004. "After Arusha Gacaca Justice in Post-Genocide Rwanda", African Studies Quarterly Vol 8 Issue 1, Fall 2004.

[5] Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front. Protocol of Agreement on Power-Sharing within the Framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW: CONCEPTUALISING RECONCILIATION

The concept of reconciliation, and efforts to measure it quantitatively, is a relatively new research focus of increasing interest internationally, although substantive work has been carried out by the IJR in this respect, through the South African Reconciliation Barometer, conducted since 2003.

This growing importance worldwide is also confirmed by the United Nation's declaration of 2009 as the International Year of Reconciliation, in order to highlight its significance for the large numbers of countries facing post-conflict transitions.[6] The concept of reconciliation is extremely complex, and encapsulates a multitude of principles, variables, dimensions, and meanings. Despite strong consensus over its necessity and desirability for enduring peace, there is little academic agreement over its definition, further complicating the task of measuring it within societies such as Rwanda.

The measurement of a social trend as complex as reconciliation is not uncontested. However, Amstutz (2006) suggests that quantifying aspects of progress in reconciliation should include evaluations of breadth and scope, referring to the numbers of people involved, as well as the depth and intensity of divisions, including degrees of inter-group trust and cooperation.[7]

James L. Gibson (2004) maintains that "truth and reconciliation are concepts that can be (and should be) measured and assessed using rigorous and systematic social science methods." Referring to the case of post-apartheid South Africa, Gibson suggests that reconciliation can be viewed in terms of "at least four specific and perhaps even independent sub-concepts", including: inter-racial reconciliation, including inter-group trust and the rejection of stereotypes; political tolerance; support for the principles (abstract and applied) of human rights; and, recognition and acceptance of the political institutions of the democratic South Africa.[8]

While global attention to reconciliation is growing, Parmentier (2009) observes that the current notion of reconciliation is "closely connected" to the ground-breaking work of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) — although it had already previously featured in the ICTR's Statute.[9] The principles underpinning the TRC's approach to reconciliation in post-apartheid South Africa included the needs for "understanding but not for vengeance", for "reparation but not for retaliation", and for "ubuntu but not for victimisation". In Rwanda, as well as in South Africa, the process of reconciliation was posited as a form of restorative justice that would bring together perpetrators of such crimes (Apartheid and genocide) with victims and the broader public, with the goal of "correcting imbalances, restoring broken relationships with healing, harmony and reconciliation."

2.1 RECONCILIATION IN THEORY

A fundamental question posed by both theorists and practitioners is whether reconciliation should be conceived as a process, or rather, as the end result of a process, or indeed both. However, often it is construed as a process that is deliberately and systematically pursued due to the desirability of its end-result.

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[6] United Nations 2006. "UN General Assembly Resolution 61/17." Available at: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/495/45/PDF/N0649545.pdf?OpenElement
[7] Amstutz, M. R., 2006. "Is Reconciliation Possible after Genocide?: The Case of Rwanda," Journal of Church and State 48(3), p. 546.
[8] Gibson, J.L., 2004. Overcoming Apartheid: Can truth reconcile a divided nation? HSRC Press and Russell Sage Foundation, Cape Town and New York, p. 4.
[9] Parmentier, S. "Transitional Justice and Reconciliation for International Crimes: who holds the roadmap?" Promotio Institiae, 103, March 2009, p. 66.

Bar-Tal and Bennink (2004) synthesise fourteen researchers' definitions of the reconciliation process as: "the formation or restoration of genuine peaceful relationships between societies that have been involved in intractable conflict, after its formal resolution is achieved."[10] This definition highlights the second major feature of reconciliation: whether seen as a process or an end, it occurs after the official conclusion to a conflict, and thus generally aims to resolve "invisible" conflict. Moreover, its focus on "societies" confirms the aim of uniting disparate groups, wherein the psychological, economic and socio-political conditions of each party are important considerations.

Kriesberg (2007) identifies the four primary dimensions of reconciliation as truth, justice, respect, and security, and states that "the degree of reconciliation varies in the extent and intensity to which all the dimensions are fulfilled."[11] Consistent with the findings of Bar-Tal and Bennink, Kriesberg suggests that reconciliation "generally refers to the process of developing a mutual conciliatory accommodation between enemies or formerly antagonistic groups". Further, the author adds that reconciliation "often refers to the process of moving toward a relatively cooperative and amicable relationship, typically established after a rupture in relations involving extreme injury to one or more sides in the relationship."[12]

I. William Zartmann, cited by Umutesi (2006), goes further and explicitly incorporates the importance of confronting the past in order to move forward and "arrive at a pacified society where free and equal individuals acknowledge each other and are capable of facing up to a history full of violent acts, and above all, are able to surmount that history."[13]

A number of theorists refer specifically to the process of political reconciliation, as referring to "only those relationships that are proper to the political order."[14] According to Amstutz (2006), "political reconciliation can be conceived as the restoration of harmonious relationships", and therefore, "to become reconciled is to overcome alienation, division, and enmity and to restore peaceful, cooperative relationships based on a shared commitment to communal solidarity."[15]

Like Gibson, Amstutz suggests that the "truth" is conducive to healing in deeply divided societies. However, the author also maintains that truth does not guarantee reconciliation, and that reconciliation and justice are not necessarily compatible, albeit equally important goals.[16] The "dominant liberal peace" approach emphasises the importance of pursuing justice in post-conflict societies through the use of the courts to recover the objective, forensic truth about conflict, and punish perpetrators accordingly. Philpott (2009) stresses the importance of this approach, in defining reconciliation as a "holistic concept, [which] involves a process of restoration [of right relationships within a community] as well as a state of restoration, addresses the wide range of harms that crimes cause, and enlists the wide range of persons affected by these crimes."[17]

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[10] Cited in Nets-Zehngut, R. "Analyzing the Reconciliation Process, International Journal on World Peace. Vol. XXIV No. 3, Sept. 2007, p. 55.
[11] Kriesberg, 6.
[12] Kriesberg, L., "Reconciliation: aspects, growth, and sequences." International Journal of Peace Studies 12(1), Spring/Summer 2007, p. 2.
[13] Umutesi, M-B., "Is Reconciliation between Hutus and Tutsis Possible?" Journal of International Affairs, Fall/Winter 2006, Vol 60(1), p. 164.
[14] Philpott, D. "An Ethic of Political Reconciliation," Ethics and International Affairs, Vol 23(4), Winter 2009, p. 392.
[15] Amstutz, p. 546.
[16] Ibid, p. 542.
[17] Philpott, p. 392.

While Philpott confirms Amstutz's position that justice does not necessarily equate reconciliation, the author adds that "reconciliation, both as a process and as an end state, is itself a concept of justice. Its animating virtue is mercy and its goal is peace. These concepts are expressed most deeply in religious traditions, including Judaism, Christianity, and Islam."[18] This implies that punitive justice and the forensic truth achieved by trials are not sufficient to ensure the other two dimensions of reconciliation, namely mutual respect and security.

Ultimately - and at times outside the scope of reconciliation theorists – ensuring security is at the heart of most national reconciliation efforts, in which both governments and citizens strive to achieve genuine and durable peace above all else. Assuring effectiveness, however, requires a conflict resolution process and peace agreement based on the basic tenets of justice, impartiality, and establishing trust between parties—which is generally both an aim and important determinant of reconciliation.[19]

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[18] Ibid, p. 390.
[19] Nets-Zehngut, p. 57.

III RECONCILIATION IN THE RWANDAN CONTEXT

As outlined in previous sections, even prior to the 1994 genocide, reconciliation was viewed as an important priority for overcoming a history of conflict within Rwandan society, as captured in the 1993 Arusha Peace Accord.

The NURC has defined unity and reconciliation as "a consensus practice of citizens who have common nationality, who share the same culture and have equal rights; citizens characterized by trust, tolerance, mutual respect, equality, complementary roles/interdependence, truth, and healing of one another's wounds inflicted by our history, with the objectives of laying a foundation for sustainable development."[20]

The NURC maintains that attaining unity and reconciliation among all Rwandans will require a "radical change on the part of the Rwandan society and willingness to transform Rwanda into a reconciled and united nation in which all citizens have equal freedoms and a country that has a common vision for a better future."[21]

The work of the NURC is framed historically by both the 1994 genocide, but also by Rwanda's history of conflict, resulting from "various historical eras of bad governance characterized by divisions and discriminations based on ethnicity, religion, region of origin and nepotism which have had devastating effects on the social relations" between Rwandans.[22]

Furthermore, it is worth noting that unity and reconciliation processes are guided by the following principles:[23]

- To promote the spirit of Rwandan identity and put national interests first instead of favours based on ethnicity, blood relations, gender, religion, region of origin, etc.

- To combat the genocide and its ideology

- To strive at creating a nation governed by the rule of law and respect for human rights

- To combat any form of divisionism and discrimination

- To promote interdependence and synergy in nation building

- To multiply strive to heal one another's physical and psychological wounds while building future interpersonal trust based on truth telling, repentance and forgiveness

- To commemorate the 1994 genocide with the aim of making "Never Again" a reality

- To strive for self-determination and passion for work

Today the NURC concentrates its attention on the following areas:

- Preparing and coordinating the national programme for the promotion of national unity and reconciliation;

- Putting in place and developing ways and means to restore and consolidate unity and reconciliation among Rwandans;

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[20] Republic of Rwanda National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, 2007. "The National Policy on Unity and Reconciliation." pp. 6-7.
[21] Ibid, p. 7.
[22] Ibid, p. 7.
[23] NURC, The National Policy on Unity and Reconciliation, Kigali August 2007, p.11

- Educating and mobilizing the population on matters relating to national unity and reconciliation;

- Carrying out Research, organizing Debates, Disseminating ideas and making Publications related to peace, national unity and reconciliation;

- Making proposals on measures that can eradicate divisions among Rwandans and to reinforce national unity and reconciliation;

- Denouncing and fighting against Acts, Writings and utterances which are intended to promote any kind of discrimination, intolerance or xenophobia; and

- Making an Annual Reports and such other reports as may be necessary on the situation of national unity and reconciliation.[24]

These functions have been achieved, in part, through the implementation of a number of key programmes, including: Ingando, which has established more than two hundred "unity and reconciliation clubs", primarily among youth; Itorero ry'igihugu, focused on ensuring ongoing peace and security and improving public service delivery; and, Igorora, a radio broadcast, in addition to a national consultations, research and other work.[25]

The Reconciliation Barometer comprises one of the new programmes introduced by the NURC, in partnership with the IJR and IRDP. Although some research has been conducted on reconciliation in Rwanda during the ten years since the NURC's inception, no studies to date have yielded comprehensive quantitative data that measures the impact of reconciliatory interventions at the national level. According to the NURC, the RRB "will be applied in measuring the indicators of the impact of unity and reconciliation right from the grassroots to the national level. The NURC is also "developing a Reconciliation Barometer Policy", which "will support our monitoring strategies particularly how unity and reconciliation is being implemented." Further, the NURC plans to "list all indicators of unity and reconciliation."[26]

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[24] The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda, Amendment N° 3 of 13/08/2008
[25] National Unity and Reconciliation Commission. "Unity and Reconciliation: Understanding Unity & Reconciliation Profess 15 Years after Genocide." NURC Review Magazine, p 11.
[26] National Unity and Reconciliation Commission. "Unity and Reconciliation: Understanding Unity & Reconciliation Profess 15 Years after Genocide." NURC Review Magazine, p 22.

IV   RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

Rwanda's substantial achievements over the last sixteen years are commendable, yet the relatively short period that has lapsed since the genocide must serve as a reminder that there is no room for complacency. Gains need to be consolidated and areas where potential weaknesses still exist must be identified, investigated and remedied.

When asked how Rwanda is doing in terms of its governance and pursuit for national unity and reconciliation, the country needs to have the best diagnostic tools at its disposal to identify areas of strength and aspects of weakness. A monitoring tool is required, which links issues of governance and national unity and can serve as an early warning system to alert social stakeholders of potential problem areas.

A number of qualitative and quantitative studies have been conducted to illuminate issues of governance and social cohesion in Rwanda. The IRDP, one of the partners in this project, has stood at the forefront of some of these efforts. A gap does however still exist in terms of quantitative survey research that combines and links the questions of national unity and reconciliation with issues of governance.

Public perception around national reconciliation, in particular, remains an under-researched aspect of this sphere of investigation. There is therefore a need to examine the sentiments of ordinary citizens towards national reconciliation. Has it been strengthened, and if so, to what extent has it contributed to the development of sense of national unity. Moreover, to what extent have institutions of governance, such as the NURC contributed to the current state of affairs? In sum, it is critical to know whether ordinary Rwandans feel the country has moved in the direction of reconciliation and unity or whether it still struggles to come to terms with its past. What are the essential obstacles and opportunities for reconciliation? Above all, what can be done to address these concerns?

One major challenge is the absence of comprehensive, reliable and coherent information, both in terms of the actual circumstances and in terms of the perceptions of reality. And even when the data is physically available in state archives, university libraries and various government departments, the data is often of such a complex and technical nature that it remains effectively inaccessible to the ordinary citizen. This can result in decisions and actions, whether by government, aid agencies or the business community, that are made without factoring in a number of social and political realities that are critical to the understanding of the context upon which they have bearing.

The RRB has endeavoured to find answers to these key questions and to make such information broadly accessible to relevant stakeholders. It examines how Rwandans from all spheres of society react towards one another and how they interact with key governance institutions, specifically as they pertain to questions of national unity and reconciliation.

4.1   PROJECT OBJECTIVE

The objective of the project is to contribute towards the process of national unity and reconciliation through an improved understanding of how ordinary Rwandans perceive and respond to efforts to promote it. It is hoped that such a study will prompt direct interventions, but also indirectly stimulate national debates around unity and reconciliation and the role that institutions of governance ought to play in this regard. As such, the project entailed a comprehensive and systematic attempt to determine

perceived successes and shortcomings related to national reconciliation and the institutions tasked with its promotion, and in the process shift discourses on its enhancement to the centre of policy-making processes.

This information is presented to the NURC in this document, but ideally it should also be disseminated more broadly to policy makers, civil society organisations and ordinary people through a targeted multi-media campaign. The knowledge, understanding and insight that the Reconciliation Barometer can generate will have the potential to equip organisations and institutions working at the coal face of the promotion of reconciliation and the protection of human rights to focus and improve their interventions.

As a result the impact of the Reconciliation Barometer will be particularly evident in the quality of the national discourse on the issues that the survey addresses.

Beyond this comprehensive survey report, further briefings and/or reports may be arranged, depending on the availability of the partners. To maximise the utility of the survey as a national resource, it may therefore also be worth considering a number of briefings to civil society organisations that are working in this sphere.

4.2   QUANTITATIVE MEASUREMENT OF RECONCILIATION

When embarking on the task of 'measuring' a process that is as subjective and contested as reconciliation, certain inherent shortcomings have to be accepted. These range from the need to oversimplify certain dimensions of the reconciliation process for the sake of measurability, to having to focus on only a select few facets of this complex and multi-dimensional concept.

The need to conduct rigorous empirical research on the progression of the national reconciliation process exists and, in fact, is greater than the inherent difficulties in embarking this task. But, as is the case with all exploratory research (whether of a quantitative or qualitative nature), a cautionary approach should be employed. The obvious danger of excessive reductionism in translating such a complex process in relation to a handful of critical indicators is recognized. On the contrary, this research recognizes the definitional and contextual ambiguity of the process. It is a first attempt at some necessary comparable quantification of the national reconciliation process.

Additionally it is important to bear in mind that the results of the first series of surveys should not be interpreted as representative of particular trends. Even in cases where change has been tremendous, three measurements – particularly across quite a short time period - do not provide sufficient evidence to assume the presence of a trend. Such changes should be treated as fluctuations; the absence or presence of trends will be confirmed by data emanating from later rounds of the survey. The results of the first rounds should at best be interpreted as snapshots of the current public sentiment on the issues that are being measured.

V   RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer is a national public opinion survey that measures progress on the road to reconciliation by means of a structured quantitative research instrument. The survey consisted of face-to-face interviews with approximately three thousand Rwandan citizens, across all thirty districts of the country.

5.1   POPULATION DATA

Rwanda is a geographically small and densely-populated country, with a surface area of 26,338 square kilometres and a national population that is predominantly rural and highly youthful.

Its most recent national census, the General Census of Population and Housing, was conducted in 2002, and estimated the national population at close to 8.2 million persons. Women marginally outnumbered men, with the national population made up of approximately 4.2 million females and 3.9 million males. The Report on the Preliminary Results of the 2002 census measures population density in 11 provinces and Kigali city. Ruhengeri Province in the north of the country (894,179 residents, or 11.0% of the national population) was identified as the most populous area of the country, and Umutara in the east of the country as the least populous (423,642 residents, or 5.2% of the national population).[27]

However, in 2006 Rwanda underwent a programme of territorial re-demarcation, resulting in a reduction of the number of provinces to 5 (Kigali City and the North, South, East and West provinces). Thirty districts were also delineated around the country.

Although some initial baseline surveys have been conducted in these recently-established districts, full population data disaggregated according to district is not yet available.[28]

As of 2008, World Bank estimates place the national population at 9,720,694,[29] with an average population growth rate of 2.8% between 2005 and 2010.[30]

The population is relatively young, and United Nations data indicates that 42.8% of the population in 2008 was aged 0-14, whereas women and men older than 60 comprised only 4.5% and 3.2% of the population respectively.

Also as of 2008, numbers of women nationally were somewhat higher than men, with a sex ratio of 93.4 men per 100 women. Life expectancy at birth remains low, at 47.8 years for women and 44.6 years for men.[31]

As of 2007, only 18% of the Rwanda population was characterised as urban by the United Nations, although the urban population growth rate of 4.2% between 2005 and 2010 surpassed the rural population growth rate of 2.4% over the same period.[32]

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[27] Republic of Rwanda Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning and National Census Commission, 2007. "National Census Service: The General Census of Population and Housing, Report on the Preliminary Results." Available at: http://www.statistics.gov.rw/
[28] According to the National Institute of Statistics, baseline surveys have been conducted in the Southern province (Kamonyi, Muhanga, Nyamagabe, Nyanza, Gisagara, Nyaruguru, Ruhango, and Huye districts), the Western province (Nyabihu, Rutsiro, Rubavu, Nyamasheke, Ngororero, Karongi, and Rusizi districts) and in Kigali city (Nyarugenge, Gasabo, and Kicukiro districts). See http://www.statistics.gov.rw/.
[29] World Bank. Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/country/rwanda
[30] UNData Country Profile: Rwanda.
[31] UNData Country Profile: Rwanda.
[32] UNData Country Profile: Rwanda. Available at: http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=Rwanda.

5.2   SAMPLE

Due to the territorial reforms introduced in the period following Rwanda's most recent census, and the limited baseline data available as yet on the district level, a reliable national sample frame is not available. Therefore, a multi-stage probability sampling methodology was utilised, with the goal of achieving a representative cross-section of Rwandan citizens.

The sample universe for the Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer includes all citizens who have reached the legal age of majority, or 18 years and older. Data from the National ID Project[33] places the national population aged 17 or less at 4,466,587 and that aged 18 and elder at 5,452,788, on the 13th January, 2010.

Taking into consideration of the desired accuracy as well as resource and operational constraints, a sample of 3,000 adults was drawn from the sample universe (5,452,788), with every effort to ensure random sampling and with the goal that every adult citizen had "an equal and known chance of being chosen for inclusion in the sample."[34]

5.3   SAMPLING STRATIFICATION

The primary stratification for the sample was at the district level, and as a baseline survey and in the absence of a sampling frame, face-to-face interviews were conducted in all of the thirty districts (Uturere) created through the 2006 territorial reform programme. However, following this stratification, random sampling methods were introduced to ensure representation. Sampling occurred as follows:

- Within each of the 30 districts (Uturere) nationally, 3 sector (umurenge) were randomly selected (of a total of 416 across the country);

- Within each of the randomly selected sectors (Imirenge), 1 cell (akagari) was randomly selected;

- Within each of the randomly selected cells (Utugari), 1 village was randomly selected;

- On village level, 33 households were randomly selected in each of the 2 first selected villages, and 34 households in the 3rd selected village for a total of 100 households per district. Households constituted the primary unit of analysis.

The average village is comprised of approximately 150 households. In many villages, each household or plot has a unique number, though this is not always the case. Upon arrival in the village, interviewers and fieldwork supervisors met with the village leader to introduce the purpose of the research. Village leaders are often very knowledgeable about residents, and were able to provide the list of households or householder's names. Interviewers then randomly selected 45 households from the total number (by drawing random numbers "from a hat"). A larger number of households than required were randomly selected in each village, for replacement purposes. (For futher details on village sampling, see Annex 1: Selected Sectors, Cells and Villages).

At the village level, further stratification was introduced according to gender. Interviewers visited each of the randomly selected households to conduct interviews with household residents (not visitors) of 18 years and older.

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[33] National ID Project is a Governement-led institution whose objective is to provide every Rwandan citizen with National ID that is implemented on electronic card. This ID contains information about the Rwandan citizen such as civil information, health information, traffic information, etc.
[34] Afrobarometer. Available at: http://www.afrobarometer.org/sampling.html.

Every second interview was conducted with a woman where possible, and all interviews were conducted with citizens of Rwanda.[35] In instances in which there more than one possible interview participant was present, meaning more than one adult of the correct gender for that household, the participant was randomly selected from available adults.

Since the definition of a household may differ from one cultural context to another, it was necessary to ensure that conceptual clarity exists as far as this term is concerned. The European Social Survey, for example, defines a household as "one person living alone, or a group of people living at the same address (and have that address as their only or main residence), who either share at least one main meal a day or share the living accommodation (or both)."[36] The World Values Survey described respondents as "belonging to the same household if they spend more than 5 nights per week in the said household",[37] while Afrobarometer regards it as "a group of people who presently eat together from the same pot."[38]

The working definition of a household in the RRB is that of the Rwanda General Census of the Population and Housing (2002). This census gives the following categories of households and definitions:

1. The private household – a group of persons who live in the same dwelling, share the same budget and have meals together, or one person living separately. The members of a household should not necessarily be in family or marital relationship.

2. The family household – a household comprising two or more persons who are in marital or family relationship. It can be spouses/cohabitants with or without a child (-ren) or one of parents with a child (-ren) living alone or together with other persons, etc.

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[35] However, in few villages, the rule did not apply because large majorities of residents were widows. This is the reason why in the respondents distribution we do have slightly more female than male rather than 50% male and 50% female.
[36] Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik, J.H.P. and Warner, U., 2009. "Private Household Concepts and their Operationalisation in Cross-National Social Surveys" Metodolo☒ zvezki, 6 (1), pp. 1-26.
[37] The Steadman Group of Companies, 2007. "WVS Rwanda 2007: Field Technical Report". Available online at: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/
[38] Afrobarometer, www.afrobarometer.org/sampling.html,

3. The non-family household – a household comprising one person or a group of persons who are not in marital or family relationship.

4. The institution – a household consisting of persons whose shelter and living needs are satisfied by an institution.

All of the following circumstances required the interviewer to leave the selected household and continue to the next randomly selected household: (1) no one at home; (2) residents refused to, or were unable to participate in the research; (3) there were no adults, aged 18 or older, present; (4) there was no respondent of the appropriate gender for that household.

However, when practicable, interviewers were permitted to return to the household at a later time if a potential participant was likely to be available. In instances in which the selected respondent was not at home to conduct the interview, supervisors instructed interviewers to conduct two additional recalls at two different times of the day when the respondent was likely to be at home.

In cases in which the selected respondent was not available at all on that day or when respondents were unwilling to participate (though this was seldom the case), interviewers regarded this as a non-response. This methodological approach is consistent by that followed by the Rwandan sample of the World Values Survey in 2007.[39] This approach also did not allow for the substitution of respondents within the same household/dwelling.

5.4   DATA COLLECTION AND ENTRY

A quantitative data collection approach was used, through the carrying out of face-to-face interviews using a structured questionnaire. The questionnaire was translated and administered in Kinyarwanda according to the preference of research participants. The instrument was also pre-tested prior to the commencement of fieldwork. (For full questionnaire, see Annex 2)

Data collection was carried out by 30 interviewers, recruited and trained by the Consultants. Requisite employment requirements included a minimum of secondary school education and experience in data collection. Training was provided by the Consultants, and focused on the context and aims of the RRB, sampling procedures, content of the survey instrument, interviewing methods, and neutrality, objectivity and research ethics. All data collection was supervised directly by the IRDP. Interviews wore clearly-marked identification confirming their status as independent fieldworkers at all times while engage in data collection. The Consultants also worked to ensure that fieldwork teams were perceived as independent, professional and broadly representative of Rwandan society.

Temporary staff were recruited to undertake data entry, using a template developed by the Consultants in SPSS format. Consultants took full responsibility for data cleaning.

5.5   QUALITY CONTROL MEASURES

Cumulatively, the following activities and measures further enforced the quality and integrity of the data collection process: the use of a participatory approach in developing research instruments; the hosting of a workshop aimed at validating the research instruments; recruitment of experienced and well-educated interviewers; comprehensive training for interviewers; pre-testing of the research instruments; close supervision of all data collection in the field; recruitment of experienced and skilled data entry staff; and close supervision of all data entry. Data analysis and reporting were carried out jointly by the IRDP and IJR.

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39 The Steadman Group of Companies, 2007. "WVS Rwanda 2007: Field Technical Report". Available online at: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/

VI FIELDWORK AND DATA COLLECTION IN PRACTICE

6.1 IMPLEMENTATION RISKS AND CHALLENGES

The Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer is the first national survey of its kind to be conducted in Rwanda. As such, several implementation challenges and risks were taken into consideration at the outset of the research.

First, as discussed previously, no national census has been conducted since territorial reforms were recently introduced, and therefore limited baseline population data was available as yet on the district level. For this reason, an equal number of interviews (100) were conducted across each of the thirty districts, to ensure as wide a geographic distribution of respondents as possible.

Secondly, because the Reconciliation Barometer was the first of its kind to be conducted in Rwanda, there was a distinct risk that fieldworkers may be met with scepticism and distrust by members of the population. However, efforts to mitigate this risk included:

- Recruitment and training of qualified and experienced fieldwork staff;

- Use of easily-identifiable fieldwork badges;

- Close supervision of fieldwork by experienced and professional fieldwork supervisors; and

- Use of interview scripts that complied with international ethical standards, and

- Guaranteeing the confidentiality and anonymity of all respondents.

6.2 EXPERIENCES IN THE FIELD

Critical to the interpretation of any survey of this nature is the political and socio-economic context within which it has been conducted. While certain public attitudes may be informed by experience and tradition over long periods of time, public opinion is far more fluid and open to be influenced by a given social context at a particular moment.

Public opinion literature is replete with examples of how political events, economic conditions, or even natural disasters, can sway sentiments within a very short space of time. In the interest of scientific rigour and the integrity of survey findings, it is therefore also of importance to assess and report on the environment within which it takes place,

This has, for example, been evident in the responses of the South African public to the SA Reconciliation Barometer Survey, where the researchers have noted distinct changes in particular results where fieldwork coincided with national and local election campaigns. Similarly, it was evident in recent years how the sudden decline in global economic fortunes has impacted on South African citizen's evaluation of their own material and physical security.

In the interest of project transparency, this report also contains a frank assessment of the socio-political and economic context within which fieldwork has taken place. This enriches the value of the report, but also will provide important interpretational markers in terms of which this dataset should be compared with datasets that will follow in its wake.

Fieldwork for the RRB began in late June, and was concluded in July, 2010, lasting approximately four weeks in total. A number of contextual considerations based on experiences in the field must be taken into account in the analysis, interpretation and understanding of the results of the RRB.

6.3   POLITICAL CLIMATE AND TRENDS

A significant characteristic feature of the fieldwork is that data collection began two months prior to presidential elections, held on 9 August.

The political mood around the country was influenced by anticipation of upcoming elections. The process of registering voters was concluding, political parties had already nominated their candidates, and opposition political parties were attempting to register to contest in the presidential race. In the same period, some party leaders faced allegations and charges of both "genocide denial" and attempting to destabilise the country.

In the pre-election environment, fieldworkers perceived some challenges in eliciting forthright responses from research participants, particularly in relation to evaluation of the governance system and related institutions. Despite multiple measures taken to ensure that fieldworkers were perceived to be independent and neutral, this was not always accepted by research participants. On many occasions, citizens were surprised that the interview did not include questions related to the upcoming elections and political party support.

Challenges resulting from the pre-election climate in the country were also marked by reciprocal allegations between the Rwandan government and emerging political opposition parties as well as independent media that the Media Highi Council ended up closing on the grounds of content considered to be subversive. Citizens closely followed these developments, particularly as they were reported through both international and Rwandan media. Nonetheless, despite these challenges, fieldwork supervisors managed to work closely with local leadership, and assure them of the Barometer's constructive objectives.

6.4   CONTRIBUTION OF LOCAL LEADERSHIP

Local leadership played an important role throughout the fieldwork process. Despite intentions to assist and improve in the efficiency of fieldwork, it is also important to acknowledge the potential influence that the presence of local leaders may have had on both the data collection process and the research findings.

From the outset of the RRB, the Consultants accepted that fieldwork of this kind could not be conducted in small towns or villages in Rwanda without the consent and cooperation of local leadership. Though authorization to conduct interviews was received at the national level through the Ministry of Local Governance, and this permission was communicated to district mayors, this was not in fact sufficient to begin fieldwork in practice. Local leadership was informed about research conducted for the RRB within respective administrative territories; while in most cases researchers were welcomed, this required advance assurance that more senior administrators had been informed and accepted the presence of fieldwork teams in the area. In some exceptional cases, local leaders demanded that they be allowed to check the content of the questionnaire before allowing interviews to begin.

Both citizens and local leaders are regularly sensitised and exposed to government programming and policies, including through assessments that often result in rewards to the best performers. In addition to generating a sense of competition between locales, many local leaders expressed aversion to

the prospect of having their particular town or village viewed as a source of negative public opinion towards the reconciliatory project. It was clear to research teams that this spirit was driving many local leaders.

Many local leaders (Akagari, Umudugudu) appeared to anticipate responses that local citizens would give to the RRB and therefore attempted to prepare those living in the sampled Umudugudu, or to secure an active role in determining which households would be visited. As Umudugudu residents themselves, local leaders also had an equal chance of being included in the research sample. Where local leaders were not interviewed, their reactions varied from indifference to anxiety. Field supervisors played important role in insuring these leaders of the objectivity of the study and in seeking leaders' neutrality.

6.5   CITIZEN RESPONSES TO THE RRB

Based on the experiences of administering the RRB in the field, interviewers concluded that citizens were generally reluctant to participate in interviews related to very sensitive topics. Prior to agreeing to participate in the research, many citizens wanted to know whether permission had been received from local leadership for the fieldwork to proceed. Fieldworkers remarked on a tendency amongst citizens to agree to participate only when assured that local leaders had been informed and granted consent for the research to take place in advance. In some instances, this even required a formal introduction of the interviewers to citizens by local leaders. While such introductions both hastened the pace of fieldwork and reduced numbers of refusals, fieldworkers also remarked that such direct involvement of local leaders in the research process could in some instances have impacted on citizen perceptions of the independence of the research team.

Another significant observation that holds particular relevance to this survey is the fact that respondents were generally hesitant to respond frankly to questions related to ethnicity. Many research participants told fieldworkers that referring to ethnic groups, such as Hutu, Tutsi or Twa, is "currently forbidden" by government. Fieldworkers also detected significant reluctance to respond to questions related to government institutions and public policies, including those of the gacaca courts, the TIG, national reconciliation policy and land redistribution. Some research participants were also under the impression that they themselves were being evaluated or tested on their knowledge and compliance with government policies.

6.6   FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS: QUALITATIVE EVALUATIONS

As discussed above, the first round of the RRB was an exploratory baseline study, and research methods were exclusively quantitative: the research instrument consisted only of a structured questionnaire with close-ended questions. Limitations, including resources and time, prevented collection of additional qualitative data, such as comments, testimonies, anecdotes, and explanations from respondents. However, such data could have allowed for a better understanding of the meaning and motives underlying public opinion, perceptions, attitudes and the behaviours of respondents.

VII ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

The Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer measures public opinion on a range of issues, and according to six main variables: human security, political culture and governance, cross-cutting relations, historical confrontation, and social cohesion and integration. These indicators are shown in Table 1 below.

The research instrument is comprised of close-ended items, predominantly on five-point scales, which measure the strength of public opinion among respondents. Research results have been analysed nationally, as well as according to a range of demographic variables, including gender, age, education level, social category and level of urbanisation.

Table1: Conceptual overview of variables, hypotheses and indicators

Variable	Hypothesis	Indicators
Political Culture	If citizens view political structures, institutions , values and leadership as legitimate and effective, reconciliation is more likely to occur	• Confidence in public institutions;, • Trust in leadership, • Respect of rule of law and courts.
Human Security	If citizens feel secure (materially, physically and culturally), they will be more willing to commit themselves to national reconciliation processes	• Physical security • Economic security • Equality of treatment/access • General security • Hope for the future • Freedom of expression
Citizenship and Identity	A shared sense of national identity, inclusive citizenship and increased tolerance will promote the cause of national reconciliation	• National identity • Individual identity • Citizenship • Shared cultural values
Understanding the Past	If Rwandans are able to confront the sources of their historical social divisions, reconciliation is more likely to occur especially between those who found themselves on different sides during the genocide	• Acknowledgement of facts • History teaching
Transitional Justice	If parties to conflict get proper justice, they are likely to be reconciled	• Truth • Punishment • Compensation • Forgiveness • Individual healing
Social Cohesion	If trust increases between Rwandan citizens, and particularly those on different side of the genocide, reconciliation is more likely to occur.	• Social distance • Tolerance • Trust

VIII RRB RESULTS: DEMOGRAPHIC FEATURES OF RESEARCH SAMPLE

As described in previous sections, fieldwork for the RRB was carried out between June and July of 2010, with face-to-face interviews conducted with approximately three thousand citizens randomly selected from across each of Rwanda's thirty districts (Uturere). Prior to undertaking analysis of research results, it is important to present an overview of the demographic characteristics of the sample overall.

Rwanda is a densely-populated country, with a national population that both predominantly rural and highly youthful. Women make up approximately 51.6% of the national population.[40] In the absence of significant additional demographic data at the national level, the research sample was weighted on the basis of this information.

8.1   AGE AND GENDER

As shown in Table 2 below, the highest percentages of both male and female respondents were aged 25-34, and the lowest percentage aged 65 or older.

Table 2: Age and gender of survey respondents (%)

	Male	Female
18-24	15.5%	14.9%
25-34	34.4%	31.6%
35-44	21.0%	22.8%
45-54	14.7%	15.3%
55-64	8.1%	9.1%
65 and older	6.3%	6.3%
Total	n = 1436	n = 1533

8.2   RESIDENCE AND EMPLOYMENT STATUS

Given Rwanda's very low levels of urbanisation, the large majority of interviews were conducted either in villages or rural areas (90.5%), and only 6.4% in large cities. Correspondingly, when asked about employment status, high percentages of Rwandans described themselves as agricultural workers (75.3%), and only 2.7% employed in the formal sector. (See Figures 2 and 3).

8.3   EDUCATION

Most Rwandans participating in the RRB reported relatively low levels of education, with 26.2% indicating that they had received no formal education at all, and 57.6% completing only primary education. Only 1.5% of respondents had received tertiary education.

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[40] See http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL.FE.ZS

Figure 2: Area in which interviews were conducted (%)

- Large city
- Small city/Large town
- Village or rural area

90.8 | 6.4 | 2.8

Figure 3: Employment status (%)

- Unemployed, not looking for work
- Unemployed, looking for work
- Employed in the formal sector
- Employed in the informal sector
- Self employed
- Agriculturre worker

75.3 | 4.8 | 6.9 | 2.7 | 2.3 | 1.6 | 2.3 | 1.1 | 1.3 | 1

Figure 4: Level of education (%)

- None
- Primary
- Some secondary
- Completed secondary
- Vocational
- Tertiary

26.2 | 57.6 | 9.6 | 2.8 | 2 | 1.5

8.4   SOCIAL CATEGORIES

In the past, a number of social divisions were created in Rwandan society, as a result of colonialisation, conflict and political change and migration patterns. Within Rwandan society, these groups exist as a social reality for many citizens, although substantial work has been done to attempt to overcome cleavages within society and foster a sense of shared national unity and identity. Although discussion of these social categories is highly sensitive for some Rwandans, analysis attitudinal and perceptual differences according to social categories can provide important data on the impact of policy and programming on all Rwandans in the country. Within the RRB sample, 16.4% of respondents identified themselves as "genocide survivors", 19.7% as "new case refugees", and 26.7% as "tigistes" or relatives of genocide perpetrators. A further 32.6% identified themselves as members of another social category, or refused to answer the question. (See Figure 5)

Figure 5: Social categories (%)

Legend:
- Genocide survivor
- Tigistes/relatives of perpetrators
- Old case refugees (1959)
- New case refugees (1994 and after)
- Historically marginalised people
- Other/refused

IX RRB RESULTS: POLITICAL CULTURE

The first variable examined through the RRB was that of political culture, based on the hypothesis that if citizens view political structures, institutions, values and leadership as legitimate and effective, reconciliation is more likely to occur.

In any society, contested views and some degree of conflict are to be expected: it is the role of a legitimate state to ensure that such conflict is managed and mitigated, and that the rights of citizens are protected. This is of particular importance for societies emerging from significant conflict, and in which peace and stability are a foremost priority.

The effective management of conflict by government requires that citizens perceive institutions of the state to be characterised by a number of critical qualities, including independence, efficiency, incorruptibility, transparency, and fairness. Ultimately, institutions that demonstrate these characteristic features garner the support of citizens and bolster the legitimacy of the state, supporting reconciliatory efforts. It is also important to examine relative trust in non-state institutions, which can play an active role in shaping public opinion and citizen behaviour.

9.1 TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS

To begin, the RRB tested citizen confidence and trust in a range of public and governance institutions, including the national parliament, Cabinet and the justice system. This focus on institutions is important, given the need for strong, impartial bodies that are able to facilitate unity and national reconciliation across all spheres of society. This is a formidable task, based on the destruction of many of these institutions during the genocide.

Data collected through the RRB indicates moderate to high levels of trust in public institutions overall, as shown in the figure below. More than nine out of every ten Rwandans indicated that they had either "a great deal" or "quite a lot" of trust in Cabinet (92.4%), and responses were comparably high for parliament (91%), the justice system (90%), community policing structures (89.8%) and local authorities (84%).

Trust in these public institutions was notably higher than trust in several other non-governmental organisations, including political parties, religious institutions and civil society organisations (CSO's). In this survey, only 16.1% of respondents indicated that they had a "great deal" of trust in political parties, and 9.7% had no trust in political parties at all. Still, close to three-quarters of all Rwandans had either "a great deal" or "quite a lot" of trust in religious institutions, and 64.8% in CSOs.

9.2 CONFIDENCE IN THE MEDIA

As described previously, allegations regarding the content of a number of independent media publications this year resulted in the closure of two newspapers by the Media High Council.

Rwandans participating in the RRB were asked about their levels of confidence in the media, and overall, 89.4% feel that the media has contributed to increasing reconciliation amongst Rwandans. However, and perhaps in relation to the closure of these newspapers, trust levels are distinctly higher in the public media than the private. While 49.0% of respondents reported quite a lot of trust in public media institutions, whereas 36.8% of respondents indicated quite a lot of trust in private media institutions.

Figure 6: Trust in public institutions (%)

The table below shows that while confidence in the private media is still relatively high at 53.6%, close to a quarter of respondents over a third of respondents ('not very much' and 'none at all' combined) have little or no confidence in this branch of the media.

Figure 7: Confidence in the media (%)

9.3   TRUST IN LEADERSHIP

In addition to demonstrating relatively high levels of trust in public institutions, survey respondents have also displayed high levels of trust in the political leadership of the country. Research participants were asked about the degree to which they trust the country's leaders to do what is in their best interest, and in addition, whether they feel that country's leaders care about all Rwandans equally.

Agreement levels were high in response to both items. Cumulatively, more than 90% of Rwandans strongly agreed or agreed that they can trust the country's leaders to do what is in their best interest. Agreement levels were only slightly lower to the question of whether leaders care about all people

in Rwanda equally, with 82% agreeing or strongly agreeing in response to this item. When asked whether the country's leaders care equally about all Rwandans, only 13.5% disagreed or disagreed strongly. (See Figure 8).

Figure 8: Trust in leadership (%)

9.4 CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

In addition to evaluating confidence in both institutions and leadership, the RRB also sought to measure public attitudes related to citizen participation in political and public life, and ability to influence the policy and decision-making processes of government.

With regard to citizen participation, a clear pattern is discernable in the RRB results: a majority of citizens indicate that they "always" attend community meetings (71.4%), and a high percentage that they would do so under certain circumstances (25.4%).

When asked how likely they would be to "get together with others to raise an issue", responses were somewhat lower, yet remained high: just over half (51.9%) indicated that they would do this "always", and about one-third (33.6%) under certain circumstances.

However, citizens appeared much more reluctant to engage in actions closely associated with protest or dispute, even where these may be permitted in law. Overall, 41% indicated they would never sign a petition, 48.6% that they would never join a boycott, and 53.3% that they would never participate in a legal protest.

Beyond the likelihood of direct participation in this range of events, the RRB sought to assess whether or not Rwandans feel they can actively influence and shape policy and decision-making processes that happen within government and affect the lives of citizens. Here, variation was also evident across citizen responses. About one-third (33.1%) of all respondents disagree that they have "space and opportunities to influence those that make the laws of the country". A further 34.2% of respondents agreed that they have "very little say in the important decisions" that affect their lives. As consistent with many of the RRB findings, there was relatively little difference in the responses given by male and female respondents. (See Figure 11).

Figure 9: Trust in leadership %

Legend: Always | Only under certain circumstance | Never | Don't know

Figure 10: Ability to influence laws and public decisions (%)

Legend: Strongly agree | Agree | Neither | Disagree | Strongly disagree

9.5   POLITICAL CULTURE SUMMARY FINDINGS

This section examined political culture as an indicator of the reconciliation occurrence, based on the hypothesis that if citizens view political structures, institutions, values and leadership as legitimate and effective, reconciliation is more likely to occur.

The results suggest high levels of confidence (90% and above) in national public institutions, and in particular in Cabinet, Parliament, the judiciary and in Community Policing. However, somewhat lower levels of confidence were detected in relation to political parties, CSOs, and private media institutions.

Significant percentages of respondents indicated high levels of trust (80% and above) in the country's leaders to act in the best interest of citizens, and to treat all people in the country equally.

Figure 11: Ability to influence laws and decisions disaggregates by gender

The RRB also found high levels of reported participation in events such as community meetings and elections (70% and above). However, citizens were far less likely to indicate that they would participate in more contested ways, such as through joining a boycott or legal protest or signing a petition. Futher, about one-third of respondents feel they do not have the "space and opportunities to influence those that make the laws of the country", and a comparable percentage (34.2%), that they have "very little say in the important decisions" that affect their lives.

Taken together, these relatively high levels of trust suggest that respondents view national leaders and governance institutions as largely legitimate and – though room for improvement remains – well-placed to contribute positively to reconciliation process. However, results also suggest that much work still remains, particularly boosting active citizen participation.

X   RRB RESULTS: HUMAN SECURITY

Times of conflict and instability bring widespread insecurity for populations, and this has been the case in Rwanda's recent history. In the post-conflict period following the genocide of 1994, it has been an imperative of the state to work to restore physical, economic and social security to citizens.

The longevity of democratic systems, regardless of what form they take, are largely dependent on the security that they can offer to those that are governed. Such security not only relates to the physical safety of citizens, but importantly also to their economic wellbeing. Freedom from starvation is no less important than the guarantee of physical safety,

 and a citizenry's submission to the laws and institutions that govern them will depend on the extent to which they are instrumental in furthering the prospects for shared prosperity in a safe environment. Without such assurances, the liberties and rights that a democratic state offers in theory become meaningless, its legitimacy wanes, and political stability increasingly becomes challenged by those that choose to exploit such weaknesses.

A substantial international body of scholarly work points to the fact that political stability is unsustainable in societies where poverty is entrenched and the prospect for its alleviation is limited. Popular discontent is further exacerbated when such societies are characterised by crude levels of income inequality and inequities in terms of access to state services. In Africa, such inequality has particularly been manifest along ethnic, tribal, and often also regional lines. Whereas high levels of poverty may therefore result in a direct challenge from the poor to state authority, the added dynamic of inequality along social group lines, superimposed upon it, further fractures the social order.

In the decades running up to the 1994 genocide, successive Rwandan governments have had to suppress perennial social challenges to perceived ethnic dominance of material resources. The end result was the self-destruction of a state through the violation of its reason for existence, the provision of human security to its citizens.

A primary challenge to the post-genocide state has therefore been to restore its legitimacy in the eyes of citizens, and it could only do so through the restoration of their sense of physical safety and economic wellbeing. Given the total destruction of the country's social cohesion and an economy that was in ruins, this was always going to be an extremely difficult challenge.

An evaluation of the country' key economic indicators suggest remarkable progress, even when compared to other states in the region that have not been exposed to similar levels of trauma. While the country continues to be classified as a low-income country, the strides that it has made from a low developmental base have been significant. In 2008 its GDP totalled US$4,46bn, compared to US$1,7bn in 2000 and US$754m in 1994 when the genocide occured.[41] Annual growth continued to climb and peaked at 11,2% in 2008, before it declined to 6% in 2009 in the wake of the global economic downturn.[42] GDP per capita has increased from US$218 in 2000 to US$458 in 2008, and life expectancy increased during the same period from 43 to 50 years.[43] These figures point to marked progress towards some of the objectives that the country has set for itself in its Vision 2020,[44] the strategic document that guides its economic growth path to 2020.

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[41] World Bank, (2010) World Bank Data Webpage [online], Available at http://data.worldbank.org/country/rwanda, [Accessed on 15/08/2010].
[42] Ibid.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Republic of Rwanda, (2000) Rwanda Vision 2020 [online], Available at: http://www.gesci.org/assets/files/Rwanda_Vision_2020.pdf, [Accessed on 16/08/2010].

Such achievements are commendable, yet it remains significant that levels of poverty have only declined marginally in spite of the robust growth that the country has experienced in recent years. In 2000, 60% of the population could be categorised as poor, while the comparative figure for 2006 was only three percentage points lower at 57%. This does suggest that the way in which the economy distributes growth within society may not be as equitable as it should be. This view has been confirmed by a study, titled "Turning Vision 2020 into Reality: From Recovery to Sustainable Human Development", which finds that the country's Gini coefficient (the global measure of inequality where a score of 0 represents complete equality and 1 complete inequality) has increased from 0.47 to 0.51 between 2001 and 2006.[45] These statistics suggest that solutions have to found to avoid them having an impact on Rwanda's political and social stability.

The RRB hypothesises that if citizens feel secure (materially, physically and culturally), they will be more willing to commit themselves to national reconciliation processes. Survey items used to test this hypothesis included question related to access to employment, housing and land ownership, and equality of treatment and access to resources.

10.1 PHYSICAL SECURITY

Participants in the RRB were asked a series of questions related to how they perceive current and future levels of physical security and safety. Data analysis suggests that, in response, most do not anticipate significant threats to their physical security in the near future.

As shown in Figure 12 below, 86% of respondents either agree or strongly agree with the statement that they do not currently fear a threat to their own physical safety or that of their families. Seventy percent either agree or strongly agree with the contention that an armed conflict within Rwanda is unlikely within the next few years, and indeed more than 94% of respondents noted that Rwanda is becoming a safer country to live in. Similarly around 79% of respondents noted that they either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that they were happy with their lives at the time that the survey was conducted.

Figure 12: Physical security (%)

	Don't know	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither	Agree	Strongly agree
Rwanda is becoming a safer country to live in	0.3	0.6	1.8	3	51.1	43.2
It is unlikely that there will be any armed conflict within Rwandan borders any time in the next few years	8.8	3.6	9	8.4	38.8	31.7
Overall, I am satsified with my life today	0.3	3.2	13.4	4.6	50.9	27.6
My family and I do not fear any threat to our physical safety	0.3	2.1	7.6	4	41.8	44.2

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[45] United Nations Development Programme, Rwanda (2007) Turning Vision 2020 into Reality: From Recovery to Sustainable Human Development, National Human Development Report of Rwanda 2007, Kigali: UNDP, p.5.

In surveys to come it would be interesting to track responses to the statement relating to the likelihood of a conflict erupting within foreseeable future again in Rwanda. While the vast majority of respondents indicated that they do not regard this as likely, responses to this statement were more dispersed. Close to 13% did regard it as likely ("disagree" and "strongly disagree"), while close to 9% responded that they don't know. Eight percent did not wage an opinion on this issue. Responses to this statement are therefore not as clear-cut in one direction. Similarly for the statement relating to satisfaction with life, the disagreement categories added up to close to 17%. When viewed together with the responses in the "neither" category, which totalled 4,6%, close to 22% of respondents did not respond as being satisfied with their lives at present.

10.2   ECONOMIC SECURITY

Overall, it appears as if Rwandans evaluate their levels of economic security and the future prospects thereof quite positively. Most respondents indicated confidence in the prospects of their own security, but also in the commitment of the Rwandan state to disburse its services and resources in an equitable way that benefits all citizens. Responses in the economic security category are, however, not as overwhelmingly optimistic as has been the case with regard to those in the physical security category.

In Table 3 below, the first, third, fifth and sixth statements deal with questions of equitable distribution of economic resources and rights, with the most notable of these being land. The second and fourth statements deal with questions of access, and here again the focus is on the question of land.

Table 3: Economic security (%)

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
In Rwanda, all people have an equal opportunity to make a living	27.8	42.5	3	21.7	3.8	1.1
It is likely that I will lose my house or land in future	7.3	25.2	7.4	40	16.5	3.4
All people benefit equally from government service delivery	21.6	47.3	3.9	19.5	5.3	2.3
In Rwanda, all people have access to land	16	44.3	5.3	25.3	5.1	4
National resources are equitably distributed in Rwanda	17.9	42.5	5.9	23.6	6.3	3.7
In Rwanda all groups enjoy equal rights	34.4	51.6	2.6	6	2.6	2.6

As noted above the response pattern to these statements differ somewhat from that of those that focussed on the issues of human security. While 70% of respondents agreed with the first statement that all Rwandans have an equal opportunity to make a living, just over a quarter of respondents disagreed ('disagree' and 'strongly disagree' combined) with this sentiment. Similarly, 25% felt that not all Rwandans benefited from government service delivery and 30% believed that national resources are not equitably distributed in society. As far as the distribution of rights in society is concerned, the picture looks somewhat different. Eighty six percent of respondents felt that all Rwandans do indeed have equal access to the rights that are offered in its constitution, while only 9% disagreed that this was the case.

As far as the two statements relating to access is concerned, close to a third of respondents agreed with the second statement in the table, which suggests the possibility that respondents might lose their homes and/or land in future. In response to the fourth statement, 30% disagreed that all Rwandans have access to land.

None of these findings show particularly strong correlations with the key demographic variables. Some results may, however, be of interest.

Twenty seven percent of all 18-24 year-olds indicated that they do not believe that all people have equal opportunities to make a living. Just over a quarter of this group also felt that Rwandans do not benefit in equal measure from government service delivery. Looking into the future, it would become increasingly important that this sentiment should change amongst young Rwandans.

Figure 13: Economic security disaggregated by gender (% agreement)

Both male and female respondents appear to be in favour of the country's progress in terms of economic security. Approximately two-thirds of both male and female respondents believe that all Rwandans have an equal opportunity to make a living, all individuals benefit equally from government service delivery, access to land, national resources and equal rights. Only a third of respondents feel that it is likely that they will lose their houses or land in the future.

These findings above, particularly those relating to land tenure and access, as well as its distribution may be of considerable significance, given the immense importance that agriculture plays in the lives of the majority of Rwandans. While the majority of Rwandans harboured positive sentiments towards each of the statements in figure 13, it would be advisable that future rounds monitor the extent to which negative sentiment fluctuates.

10.3   CHANGES IN RWANDA SINCE 1994

Respondents to the RRB were asked about improvements made in the country since 1994, and in comparison with the experience of genocide, it is clear that a majority feel great strides have been made in many respects. Probably the most significant of these improvements has been in the field of education. In this regard 50.1% of Rwandans noted that the education system has 'improved a great deal' and a

further 41.4% felt that it has 'improved'. Perceptions related to improvements were also highly positive in relation to issues of overcoming social divisions in the post-conflict period: 94.0% indicated that relations between different ethnic groups have improved since 1994; 90,6% noted improvements to relations between people of different backgrounds; 88,5% felt that the situation of returnees improved; and 84,5% indicated that their hope for the future increased. (See the table below).

Notably, however, the level of positive evaluation for economic change is somewhat lower. Overall, 15.4% of respondents indicated that their personal economic situation has in fact worsened over the past sixteen years since the genocide. A further 21.5% felt that access to employment opportunities has worsened, and a further 28.2% responded in this way with regard to the gap between rich and poor. Access to both land and housing seemed to be of concern for Rwandans, with 41.5% and 39.7% respectively indicating that these had worsened.

Table 4: Changes in Rwanda since 1994 (%)

	Improved a great deal	Improved	Stayed the same	Worsened	Worsened a great deal	Don't know
Personal economic situation	19.0	57.6	7.3	13.0	2.4	0.5
Relations between different ethnic groups	27.6	66.4	2.3	2.8	0.3	0.5
Family well-being	17.0	63.5	6.4	10.4	2.2	0.4
Relations between people from different regional origins	25.9	64.7	3.5	3.1	0.6	2.2
Employment opportunities	14.6	47.1	8.3	17.2	4.3	8.3
Access to education	50.1	41.4	1.6	4.7	1	1.2
Hope for the future	28.5	56	3.6	6.7	1.8	3.3
Access to land	9.8	35.9	8.9	31.2	10.3	3.8
Access to housing	10.8	39.3	7.1	28.9	10.8	3
Security of national borders	28.7	52.3	2.4	2.9	0.7	12.8
Situation of returnees in country	30.6	57.9	3	2.6	0.7	5
Gap between rich and poor	11.2	43.4	13.6	19.7	8.5	3.4

10.4   DIRECTION OF THE COUNTRY OVERALL

The results of the RRB also indicate an overwhelming level of approval for the overall direction of the country. Of the total sample, 95.2% indicated that national reconciliation in Rwanda was going in the right direction. A further 91.7% of respondents also indicated that democratic governance was going in the right direction.

The majority of respondents, both male and female, believe that the country is going in the right direction, in terms of both national reconciliation and democratic governance in Rwanda.

10.5   HUMAN SECURITY SUMMARY FINDINGS

The results analyses in the preceding two sections suggest that Rwandans, by and large, experience a significant degree of physical security. Large majorities have also indicated that they do not foresee significant changes in future as far as this state of affairs is concerned.

Figure 14: Direction of the country overall (%)

Right direction ■ Undecided ■ Wrong direction

Figure 15: Direction of the country overall disaggregated by gender (%agreement)

Male ■ Female

Such security, it can be argued, is however largely dependent on the degree of material security that citizens experience. In this regard the majority of respondents have also expressed positive sentiments towards the prospects for their personal economic circumstances, as well as the commitment of the state to support human development in an equitable and fair fashion. It has nevertheless been apparent that respondents have more reservations about matters relating to economic security than is the case for physical security. In some instances more than a quarter of respondents felt that more could be done to improve matters in this regard.

Since the responses to these statements all represent baseline measurements, it is difficult to assess at this stage whether they represent improvement or decline. Further measurement and analysis, especially as far as socio-economic security is concerned, will therefore be critical in future surveys.

XI   RRB RESULTS: CITIZENSHIP AND IDENTITY

Rwanda, like other countries, is home to a rich and diverse national population, with citizens of different backgrounds, genders, languages, ethnic groups, and geographic areas of origin. Today, citizen rights are protected across these differences, and the government has worked to promote a national identity based on shared values and overcoming the differences of the past in the post-conflict period.

The RRB explored a third indicator related to citizens and ethnicity, with the hypothesis that a shared sense of national identity, inclusive citizenship and increased tolerance will contribute to greater reconciliation.

Coming from any part of the country, speaking a given language, belonging to a certain ethnic group, etc. does not make someone to be less citizen than any other who belong to a different ethnic group, speaks a different language, or comes from a different part of the country, of opposed sex, etc.

Every individual is a set of identity elements that are not conflicting as far as only one person is concerned, problem raise when interests of people from "opposing" identity elements clash. Rebuilding an identity based post conflict society bring leaders to decide on how to manage differences, on whether focus on overlapping identity or individual ones. As would ask Engin F.ISIN & Patricia K. WOOD, "What happens when we take the ethos of pluralisation seriously in specific fields of politics today against a fear of fragmentation?" Despite sceptical positions of these authors who speak of "false hope for a promised land where citizenship and identity are forever reconciled", choosing to strengthen shared identity should not equal negation of individual identity. Path to national unity implies a society where no one feels more national than others, where citizens feel proudness of bearing shared national identity, where shared values are empowered and, at the same time, individual identity recognized.

Survey questions related to this indicator focused on perceptions of individual and national identity, attitudes regarding citizenship, and the prevalence of shared cultural values.

11.1   NATIONAL IDENTITY

Since the end of the genocide, the Rwandan government has worked to build and strengthen a shared national identity, specifically in law and policy, and through the establishment of the NURC and other governance institutions.

A large majority of RRB respondents (72.1%) strongly agreed that they are proud to be citizens of Rwanda – cumulatively, "strongly agree" and "agree" responses to this question were close to 100%. A further 46.2% of respondents strongly agreed that all citizens share common values. When asked about whether some see themselves as "more Rwandan" than others, disagreement with this statement reached 71.1%, though about one-fifth did agree that some citizens do see themselves as "more Rwandan than others".

The RRB also tested the extent to which Rwandans believe reconciliation has been embraced as a national value and practice by citizens. More than 90% agreed that "common national values leading to reconciliation are being promoted in Rwanda today," and 97.4% agreed that "most Rwandans believe that reconciliation is an important priority". A further 96.4% agreed that the everyday actions and behaviour of most Rwandans promote reconciliation. (See table below).

Table 5: National identity and contributions to reconciliation (%)

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly disagree
I am proud to be a citizen of Rwanda	72.1	25.8	1.4	0.4	0.1
In Rwanda, all citizens share common values	46.2	47.5	1.8	2.1	0.7
There are some Rwandans who see themselves as more Rwandan than others	7.0	14.4	3.0	42.6	28.5
Common national values leading to reconciliation are being promoted in Rwanda today	43.0	51.5	1.4	1.4	0.5
Most Rwandans believe that reconciliation is an important priority	46.6	50.8	1.2	0.8	0.2
In everyday life, the actions and behaviour of most Rwandans promote reconciliation	44.2	52.2	1.9	0.9	0.2

11.2 INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY

The RRB also sought to assess how Rwandans identify themselves individually, in the context of significant efforts to overcome past divisions in the country (see table below). A large majority of respondents (70.8%) strongly agreed when asked whether they would want their children to think of themselves as Rwandans, over and above any other social identity.

A slightly lesser majority (63.6%) strongly agreed that it is more important to identify oneself as Rwandan than any other form of identity. As discussed in relation to experiences in the field, many research participants indicated that they believed that references to ethnicity or ethnic groups are prohibited in Rwanda. (See Figure 16a)

Barometer respondents were also asked about the social groups with which they identify most strongly (See Figure 16b), with interesting results. Across a range of response options, Rwandans were most likely to associate themselves closely with either others who shared their religious beliefs (16.6%) or those with similar values (16.6%). A further 12% identified most closely with others from the same geographic region. When asked about secondary identity, responses were relatively similar, though larger percentages indicated a close association with others of the same age (11.9%) or gender (10.2%).

Figure 16a: Individual identity (%)

Legend: Strongly agree | Agree | Neither | Disagree | Strongly disagree

Legend:
- ■ Secondary identity (red)
- ■ Primary identity (blue)

Data by category (Secondary identity / Primary identity):
- Don't know: 21.6 / 2.7
- Other: 5.3 / 19.6
- Those who are of the same age as I am: 11.9 / 7.3
- Those who are of the same gender as I am: 10.2 / 6.8
- Those who study or work with me: 8.3 / 5
- Those who share my values: 11.2 / 16.6
- Those who share my religious beliefs: 12.6 / 16.6
- Those who belong to my ethnic group: 3.3 / 6
- Those who come from the same region as I do: 6.8 / 12

11.3   SUMMARY FINDINGS ON CITIZENSHIP AND IDENTITY

In this section, the analysis focuses on citizenship and identity among Rwandans, with the hypothesis that a shared sense of national identity, inclusive citizenship and increased tolerance will promote the cause of national reconciliation.

Results suggest that high percentages of respondents (more than 90%) are proud to be citizens of Rwanda, and believe that all citizens share a set of common values. Most also agreed that national values currently being promoted, as well as actions and behaviours among citizens, are actively leading to reconciliation in the country. Most respondents believe it is more important to identify oneself as Rwandan than any other form of identity, and would like their children to think of themselves primarily as Rwandan rather than Hutu, Tutsi or Twa. Results also suggest that many respondents also identified closely with others sharing their values or religious beliefs.

XII UNDERSTANDING THE PAST

A fourth variable examined by the RRB related to understanding the past, with the hypothesis that if Rwandans are able to confront the sources of historical social divisions, reconciliation is more likely to occur, particularly between those who found themselves on opposing sides during the genocide. The project identified the degree to which a shared understanding of the country's history exists as a critical indicator of the extent to which the country is coming to terms with its past. To this end the project presented respondents with a number of statements that attempts to measure the question from various perspectives.

12.1 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS OF FACTS AND HISTORY TEACHING

The tables below present the levels of agreement with each of these statements in terms of the total national sample, but also in disaggregated form to account for responses from different age groups.

Table 6: Understanding the past disaggregated by age category (% agreement)

Agreement	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65 +	Total
Many of Rwanda's conflicts can be blamed on ethnic manipulation	64.7	68.4	67.7	69.8	65.5	71.1	69.7
Major issues related to conflict between Rwandans have been frankly discussed and understood	86.9	87.6	87.3	83.3	87.5	91.4	87.0
Before the genocide, the way history was taught and understood in Rwanda created divisions in society	89.4	95.3	95.6	94.2	95.7	94.1	97.9
Conflict between the elite within the political sphere have been effectively managed	62.0	60.8	58.0	55.1	56.7	63.1	59.3
Today, teaching and understanding of true Rwandan history encourages reconciliation	95.8	95.8	94.3	92.6	93.7	94.7	94.7
Although it is against the law, some Rwandans would try to commit genocide again, if conditions were favourable	41.9	44.2	39.1	38.7	32.0	29.4	39.9
Number of respondent	450	979	652	446	255	187	2970

The results show that an overwhelming majority of respondents (97.9%) do feel that the way in which history was conveyed from one generation to another has contributed to major divisions in society, and as a result 94.7% indicated that they felt that the current approach to its teaching is far more conducive to the promotion of reconciliation. A considerable majority (87.0%) also agreed that in the sixteen years following the genocide most of the major issues related to its causes and consequences have been frankly discussed and understood. A somewhat lower level of agreement (59.3%) was registered for the statement, which proposed that conflicts between members of the political elite has been effectively managed. Agreement levels for those that agreed with the suggestion that "many of Rwanda's conflicts can be blamed on ethnic manipulation" (69.7%), are also less emphatic than those for most of the other statements. A result, which may be of concern and should be taken note of, is the fact that 39.9% of respondents agreed that "although it is against the law, some Rwandans would try to commit genocide again, if conditions were favourable". This does raise questions about respondents' sense of human security and may need further probing.

In relation to this particular question, it was important to examine potential differences in terms of age categories, particularly given the recent changes in the way Rwandan history is taught to a new generation in schools and through public awareness campaigns. The results show few generational differences between the first five age categories. The eldest category, those older than 65, is however distinct in that the level of agreement at 29.4% is about 10% below that of the average level of agreement.

Table 7: Understanding the past disaggregated by social categories (% Agreement)

	Genocide survivor	Tigistes/ Relatives of perpetrators	Old case refugees*	New case refugees	Historically marginalised*	Other/ refused
Many of Rwanda's conflicts can be blamed on ethnic manipulation	73.3	73.8	70.2	62.2	74.2	63.3
Major issues related to conflict between Rwandans have been frankly discussed and understood	84.8	84.4	87.2	91.1	93.5	87.5
Before the genocide, the way history was taught and understood in Rwanda created divisions in society	94.9	94.6	95.7	94.2	96.8	93.5
Conflict between the elite within the political sphere have been effectively managed	57.0	54.9	61.7	62.7	61.3	62.0
Today, teaching and understanding of true Rwandan history encourages reconciliation	95.3	93.7	91.5	95.6	93.5	95.1
Although it is against the law, some Rwandans would try to commit genocide again, if conditions were favourable	52.0	35.3	63.8	39.0	41.9	35.7
Number of respondents	486	792	94	586	31	969

*While responses to certain social categories have been included, small numbers of self-identified respondents within those categories prevent meaningful statistical analysis.

Given the country's historical social fragmentation and its further entrenchment by the 1994 genocide, it would also be of significance to investigate the degree to which there may be variance in responses of the country's different social sectors. From the results that have been presented in the table above, it is apparent that there have been relatively little differences in the responses of the respective categories to each of the statements. The one important exception, however, lies with opinions regarding the final statement that there are elements in the Rwandan society that would perpetrate acts of genocide if given the opportunity. While the national average for agreement on this question stands at 39.9%, the figure for the 'genocide survivors' and 'old case refugees' stood at 52% and 63.8% respectively.

This must be contrasted with the 35.3% of 'tigistes/relatives of perpetrators' category. Yet, given the history related to the latter category, it is significant that also here we find more than a third of respondents in agreement.

12.2 SUMMARY FINDINGS ON UNDERSTANDING THE PAST

In this section, the degree to which a shared understanding of the country's history exists as a critical indicator of the extent to which the country is coming to terms with its past was examined. The underlying assumption was that if Rwandans are able to confront the sources of historical social divisions, reconciliation is more likely to occur, particularly between those who found themselves on opposing sides during the genocide.

The results suggest very high percentages of Rwandans with the view that before the genocide, the way history was taught and understood in Rwanda created divisions in society (98%), and that today, teaching and understanding of true Rwandan history encourages reconciliation (94.7%). Moreover, there are significant percentages of respondents with the view that major issues related to conflict between Rwandans have been frankly discussed and understood (87%), and that many of Rwanda's conflicts can be blamed on ethnic manipulation (69.7%).

It was noteworthy to find that a relatively high percentage of respondents believed that, although it is against the law, some Rwandans would try to commit genocide, if conditions were favourable (almost 40%).

Surprisingly, such a belief remains higher in younger people (aged 18-34) than among older people, and among genocide survivors and old case refugees than among relatives of genocide perpetrators, tigistes and new case refugees.

Based on the above results, it is obvious that large majority Rwandans share the view that history teaching and ethnic manipulation have significantly shaped the division among Rwandans. While acceptance of a shared understanding of some events of the past may contribute positively to the reconciliation process, the persistent fear of a recurrence of genocide may also impede this process.

XIII TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

The aftermath of the 1994 genocide brought a profound imperative for justice for its victims, without which the rebuilding of a society torn apart by violence would have been virtually inconceivable. However, the collapse of the judicial system was a major casualty of this period. In a system ill-equipped to managed such massive challenges, alternative structures were introduced to proceed with the prosecution of genocide perpetrators. Within Rwanda, the Gacaca courts represented a primary restorative justice measure to try cases of genocide crimes at community level, while internationally, the United Nations established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).

The RRB hypothesised that if parties to conflict feel they have received justice, they are more likely to be reconciled. This was tested through a range of survey items related to prosecutions, truth-telling, individual healing, compensation and forgiveness.

13.1 INDIVIDUAL HEALING

The questions in the table bellow provide an overview of how Rwandans think about a number of a key questions relating to justice and reconciliation, as far as individual healing is concerned.

Table 8: Individual healing (%)

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
I have forgiven those who hurt others in the past	36.5	53.4	6.5	2.2	.7	.6
Many genocide perpetrators have shown remorse for their crimes	21.6	61.2	5.9	6.9	1.6	2.8
Those who did wrong in the past have sought forgiveness	23.0	57.4	8.8	7.5	1.8	1.3
The attitude of some Rwandans suggests that they still want to take revenge for the events of the past	5.8	20.1	5.8	37.6	23.5	6.9
I feel that I have healed from the wounds of the past	23.0	55.5	8.2	8.9	2.7	1.5
I have no choice but to reconcile with others in my community, or face the consequences	11.3	23.2	6.8	35.6	20.9	2.0
I personally have experienced reconciliation in my own life	34.3	51.1	7.3	3.2	2.2	1.5

The responses to these questions suggest that Rwandans are willing to forgive crimes that were perpetrated against them or their families; that they largely perceive perpetrators to be remorseful; and that they are willing to commit themselves to a national reconciliation project.

If one combines the 'agree' and 'strongly agree' responses for the statement that the respondent has forgiven those that have hurt others during the past, it is apparent that close to 90% agreed that this has indeed been the case; 82.9% felt that genocide perpetrators have demonstrated sufficient remorse; and 80.4% of Rwandans were convinced that most wrongdoers have sought forgiveness since the genocide. Just over a quarter of respondents (25.9%) do, however, believe that revenge by some in society still remains a possibility, while 61,1% disagreed with this notion.

The same table shows that 78.5% of respondents experienced personal healing in response to the statement: "I feel that I have healed from the wounds of the past", and a further 85.4% indicated that they have personally experienced reconciliation. In response to the statement that suggests that respondents have reconciled with others because they don't have any other option, 34.5% agreed, while 55.6% disagreed.

The majority of male and female respondents indicate a willingness to forgive perpetrators of the genocide (89.3% of males and 90.3% of females).

A further 83.2% of males and 82.4% of females believe that many genocide perpetrators have shown remorse for their crimes and 79.9% of males and 81% of females believe that those who did wrong in the past have sought forgiveness. About one in four males (26.6%) and females (25.4%) agree that the attitude of some Rwandans suggest that they still want to take revenge for the events of the past. 79.6% of males and 77.5% of females agree that they have healed from the wounds of the past. A small percentage of male and female respondents agree that they have no choice but to reconcile with others in their communities (33% of males and 35.7% of females). A larger percentage of Rwandans agree that they have personally experienced reconciliation in their own lives (85.3% of males and 85.4% of females).

Figure 17: Individual healing disaggregated by gender (% agreement)

13.2 PARTIES TO RECONCILIATION

For reconciliation to take root in a society, some form of consensus need to exist around who the primary parties to such a process should be. The survey has attempted to ascertain which groups ordinary Rwandans think are critical to the national reconciliation process. The tables below contain a number of options, with which respondents were presented, as well as the results that this measurement instrument has rendered. Participants were asked to suggest a primary and secondary combination of parties that need to be reconciled.

In response to the request, to identify the primary parties to national reconciliation, the first option was "Genocide Perpetrators and Survivors" with 48.4%, followed by "Rwandans and other Rwandans" with 33,2%, and then "Hutu and Tutsi Ethnic Groups" with 15.0%. Responses to the remainder of categories are insignificant, given response percentages of less than 1%. In terms of the next table,

which reflects on the second most important combination of parties to national reconciliation, "Rwandans and other Rwandans" (25.9%) was the most selected option, followed by "Hutu and Tutsi Ethnic Groups" (20.2%), and surprisingly the third most selected option has been the "Don't Know" option with 16.4%. Following shortly behind this category has been the "Genocide Perpetrators and Survivors" category with 15.9%.

Table 9: Parties to reconciliation

	Primary response		Secondary response	
	%	N	%	N
Rwandans and other Rwandans	33.2	983	25.9	759
Genocide perpetrators and genocide survivors	48.4	1434	15.9	466
Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups	15.0	443	20.2	594
Civil society organisations and citizens	.9	27	1.5	45
Old case refugees and other Rwandans	.7	21	1.8	53
Citizens and leaders	.3	9	2.0	60
Leaders between themselves	.4	13	3.2	95
Rwandan government and the international community	.2	5	4.5	131
Other	.1	4	6.1	178
Refused	.2	7	2.4	71
Don't know	.5	15	16.4	482
Total	100.0	2961	100.0	2935

Further investigation would probably be required to ascertain why the "Don't know" option could elicit more responses than a far more obvious category such as the latter.

13.3 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN RWANDA

After a violent and divisive conflict, such as that of Rwanda, it is very likely that perceptions of justice will vary according to the side of the conflict that an individual found himself or herself on. It therefore follows that the creation of a justice system, which enjoys confidence and legitimacy from all opposing parties, would be a massive challenge for the transition from violence to sustainable peace.

An important indicator of reconciliation in such contexts is therefore the extent to which people trust the justice system to bring about law and order, regardless of who comes before it. The table below presents a number of statements that gauge Rwandan public opinion in this regard.

A cursory view of the results presented above suggests that Rwandans are generally satisfied with the course of justice and the instruments and institutions that have been used to bring this about.

For an overwhelming percentage of Rwandans, 93.7% (agree and strongly agree combined), most of what happened during the genocide has become known through the processes of the Gacaca courts. Since all respondents were older than 18 it is therefore likely that most have attended a Gacaca court at least once. This percentage is significantly high to suggest that all Rwandans social categories hold a majority view that almost all information were revealed throughout Gacaca meetings. This finding may be largely due to the fact that an overwhelming majority (83.4%) of respondents also indicated that they believed in the impartiality of Gacaca Judges.

Table 10: Perceptions on justice delivered

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
The truth about the genocide in Rwanda, as it really happened, was revealed through Gacaca courts	49.4	44.3	2.0	2.0	1.0	.2
Inyangamugayo were impartial in the Gacaca process	35.7	47.7	5.6	8.0	1.4	.1
Those convicted through Gacaca received fair punishment	34.1	55.2	3.0	5.4	.9	.1
Those convicted through Gacaca have served sentences and been reintegrated into Rwandan society	40.6	54.2	1.8	1.4	1.4	.1
Genocide survivors have been compensated for the crimes committed against them	19.6	51.2	7.5	12.8	4.1	.0
Genocide will never occur again in Rwanda, because the underlying causes have been dealt with	35.8	47.2	5.3	3.8	4.2	.1
Survivors of the genocide have received enough support and assistance from government	18.5	51.0	6.2	11.4	8.8	.1
Those whose properties/assets had been abusively taken from them (1959 and 1994) have recovered them	28.0	49.3	5.8	10.6	4.5	.0
Land redistribution after 1994 has lowered land-related issues	16.5	45.4	3.8	5.9	26.4	.1
Land redistribution after 1994 has impacted positively on social cohesion	17.2	41.8	4.3	7.5	26.6	.1

The objective of Gacaca justice was not a retributive justice, but rather restorative, which implies that its primary purpose was not punishment but rebuilding trust among Rwandans and to facilitate reconciliation. Asked about the fairness of punishment, 89% of Rwandans responded that they felt that the punishment received by perpetrators were fair. The statement relating to compensation shows that 70.8% of respondents felt that genocide survivors were fairly compensated. It is worthy noting that compensation was meant and understood by both researchers and respondents as restitution of material belongings lost following the genocide.

Instead of compensation, in its legal sense, Rwanda post-genocide leadership placed specific emphasis on the provision of support to more vulnerable genocide survivors. A Genocide Survivors' Fund (FARG: Fonds d'Assistance aux rescapés du Génocide) was, for example, instituted for this purpose. Though significant achievements were made, there are also number of shortcomings to this dispensation that have been raised Rwanda. As shown in the statement relating to government support for survivors, 69.5% of respondents indicated that they approved of government efforts in this regard.

Land restitution remains a critical issue in post-genocide Rwanda, given the central role that land has played during the genocide but also in the decades leading up to it. A sensitive and efficient approach to this question was therefore critical over the past sixteen years. In terms of the public opinion expressed in this survey, the majority of citizens (83%) have expressed approval for the measures thus far to restore ownership to those who were forcefully removed.

A lower percentage (62%) has however indicated that restorative measures have reduced the number of disputes related to land, while an even lower percentage (59%) felt that it has contributed to social cohesion.

In terms of the future stability of Rwanda it is important that citizens do not live in fear of the kind of violence that the country has witnessed in 1994. Often the tension associated with such fear can be enough to ignite unnecessary conflict. Most respondents (83%), however, indicated that they believe that the causes of the violence have been sufficiently dealt with to ensure that this would not happen again.

Figure 18: Perceptions on justice delivered (% agreement)

The data indicates that the majority of both male and female respondents believe that the truth about genocide was revealed through gacaca (94.4% of males and 93.2% of females). 83.5% of males and 83.3% of females believe inyangamugayo were impartial during the gacaca process. 89.2% of males and 89.5% of females believed that those convicted through gacaca received fair punishment. 95.1% of males and 94.3% of females agreed that those convicted through gacaca have served sentences and have been reintegrated into Rwandan society. 70.1% of males and 71.6% of females agreed that genocide survivors have been compensated for crimes committed against them. 85.6% of males and 80.5% of females agreed that genocide will never occur again in Rwanda; because the underlying causes have been deal with 68.7% of males and 70.3% of females believe that survivors of the genocide have received enough support and assistance from the government. 78.4% of males and 76.2% of females agree that those whose properties/assets had been taken away from them have recovered them. 63.9% of males and 59.8% of females agreed that land redistribution after 1994 has lowered land-related issues. 60.8% of males and 57.4% of females believe that land redistribution after 1994 has impacted positively on social cohesion.

The figure above presents findings for the entire Rwandan population.

For a more comprehensive analysis, it would however also be necessary to ascertain whether there are significant differences in the way that historically distinct social groups or sectors respond to these same questions. The table below disaggregates the same results on this basis.

Table 11: Perceptions on justice to Rwandans disaggregated by their social categories (% agreement)

	Genocide survivor	Tigistes/ relatives	Old case refugees*	New case refugees	Historically marginalised*	Other/ refused
Many genocide perpetrators have shown remorse for their crimes	71.5%	86.1%	68.1%	85.9%	96.8%	85.1%
Those who did wrong in the past have sought forgiveness	69.1%	84.7%	66.0%	84.8%	83.9%	81.2%
The attitude of some Rwandans suggests that they still want to take revenge for the events of the past	30.0%	24.9%	29.8%	26.8%	19.4%	24.3%
I have no choice but to reconcile with others in my community, or face the consequences	42.6%	32.5%	42.6%	31.0%	41.9%	33.3%
Those convicted through gacaca received fair punishment	80.7%	92.2%	90.4%	92.0%	93.5%	89.5%
Genocide survivors have been compensated for the crimes committed against them	56.7%	73.7%	66.0%	79.1%	67.7%	71.5%
Survivors of the genocide have received enough support and assistance from government	61.2%	69.4%	73.1%	77.4%	60.0%	69.1%
Land redistribution after 1994 has lowered land-related issues	58.6%	54.6%	76.3%	66.2%	61.3%	65.6%
Land redistribution after 1994 has impacted positively on social cohesion	55.6%	51.9%	73.4%	63.0%	67.7%	62.8%
Number of respondents	n = 486	n = 792	n = 94	n = 586	n = 31	n = 969

*While responses to certain social categories have been included, small numbers of self-identified respondents within those categories prevent meaningful statistical analysis.

As became evident in previous tables, most respondents agree about the positive achievements of the transitional justice measures that have been put in place. The table above shows that if broken down in the respective population sectors, genocide survivors, perpetrators relatives, tigistes, historically marginalized people, old and new case refugees and the "others" group display high levels of agreement with the idea that genocide perpetrators have shown remorse. Such agreement is highest amongst historically marginalised people (96.8%), followed by the combined category of tigistes and the relatives of genocide perpetrators at 86.1%.

It is worth noting that the more reluctant category seems to be the "old case refugees", which registered a considerably lower level of agreement at 68.1%.

An interesting aspect of these disaggregated findings has been the fact that responses for genocide survivors have been quite similar to those of "old case refugees." Similarly, the same is observable for the responses of "perpetrators relatives and tigistes" and "new case refugees" groups.

Levels of agreement are relatively lower when it comes to assertions regarding land redistribution and its impact on the lowering of conflict and the promotion of social cohesion. The table above show that "old case refugees" display high levels of agreement with the relevant statements, as opposed the slightly lower affirmative responses by the "perpetrators relatives and tigistes" category. On the final two statements, responses from "genocide survivors" and "perpetrators relatives and tigistes" appear to be quite close to each other. In this regard it is worth remembering that most "old case refugees"

do not live in their "traditional lands", largely because they were not able to reoccupy them when they returned back to Rwanda after 35 years in exile. Many have settled on new sites, which have been allocated by the government, while others have bought properties through their own means.

All statements up to this point have dealt with domestic responses to justice in Rwanda. In the table below we present responses to the effectiveness of an external instrument of justice, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).

While most Rwandans are aware of the purpose and nature of the ICTR, it is quite notable that close to a quarter of citizens are not able to wage an opinion on its effectiveness. While about 59% of respondents felt that it was effective ("very effective" and "effective" combined), only about 13% regarded it as ineffective.

Figure 19: Level of agreement over ICTR performance

Effectiveness of the ICTR

■ Very effective ■ Effective ■ Neither ■ Ineffective ■ Very ineffective ■ Don't know

13.4   SUMMARY FINDINGS ON TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

Results presented in this section looked at transitional justice tested the hypothesis that if parties to conflict believe that they have received justice, they are likely to be reconciled. Data suggests that most respondents believe they have begun to heal from the wounds of the past through the giving and seeking of forgiveness, and many felt they have begun to experience reconciliation in their own lives.

However, more than one-third of respondents also felt that reconciliation was not a voluntary process but rather a necessity of circumstances. Further, more than one-fourth felt the attitudes of some Rwandans suggest that they still want to take revenge for the events of the past. Genocide survivors and perpetrators (48.4%) were thought to be the main parties to reconciliation.

The RRB also found relatively high levels of confidence in Gacaca as a transitional justice mechanism. More than eighty percent of respondents approved of the achievements of these community-based courts in terms of revealing the truth, punishing perpetrators, and impartiality of judges. Taken together, these data suggest relatively high levels of satisfaction with the delivery of justice. Approval levels were lower, however, regarding compensation for genocide survivors, and the effectiveness of the ICTR.

XIV SOCIAL COHESION

Data analysed in previous sections suggests that significant progress has been made in overcoming the divisions of Rwanda's past, and in bringing about greater social cohesion in the aftermath of the 1994 genocide. Data presented in this section suggests a positive shift in inter-ethnic relations, and a considerable degree of willingness to engage in interactions with people from different ethnic groups. Trust levels between groups also appear to have improved. However, the RRB also indicates that economic cleavages present a new challenge for Rwandan society today, with the gap between rich and poor perceived to be a significant source of social division.

14.1   PERSONAL EXPERIENCE OF ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION

The results of the RRB data suggest relatively low levels of ethnic based-prejudice, discrimination and stereotyping among adult Rwandans. Most (about 93%) indicated that they have never experienced ethnic prejudice since the end of the genocide, while only 6% reported that they have fallen victim to prejudice of this nature.

However, the data also indicates that almost one-third of respondents (31.5%) think that ethnic discrimination is still practiced in Rwanda, although it is against the law, although about sixty percent disagreed. Similarly, 30.5% believe that Rwandans still judge each other on the basis of ethnic stereotypes, will 62% believe this no longer takes place.

Figure 20: Experience of ethnic discrimination

Table 12 below presents levels of agreement (those who either 'agree' or 'strongly agree') with a number of statements measuring perceptions of ethnic prejudice since the end of the genocide. These have been disaggregated in terms of the different population sectors between which the survey distinguishes.

About twenty-eight percent (27.7%) of those who regard themselves as falling within a category other than those listed agreed that Rwandans still judge each other on the basis of ethnic stereotypes, as well as 39.1% of genocide survivors, 28% of new case refygees and 43.6% of old case refugees.

Table 12: Experiences of ethnic discrimination by social group (% agreement)

	Genocide survivor	Relative of perpetrator	Tigiste	Old case refugee	New case refugee	Hist. marginalised people	Refused	Other
I have never experienced ethnic prejudice in Rwanda since the end of the genocide	87.9	93.0	97.1	87.2	94.2	96.8	95.9	94.8
Although ethnic discrimination is banned in Rwanda, it still occurs	44.1	30.3	18.2	52.1	31.2	41.9	42.6	32.2
Rwandans still judge each other on the basis of ethnic stereotypes	39.1	28.3	18.2	43.6	28.0	32.3	35.2	27.7
NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS	486	757	34	94	585	31	122	845

*While responses to certain social categories have been included, small numbers of self-identified respondents within those categories prevent meaningful statistical analysis.

Figure 21: Experience of ethnic discrimination, disaggregated by age group (% agreement)

This figure above presents responses to the same three questions, but disaggregated in terms of different age categories. It points to only slight differences in the way that respondents of different age groups experience ethnic prejudice. Although at least more than 91% of all respondents have never experienced ethnic prejudice since the end of the genocide, the absence of such experiences increases from younger to older age categories.

Differences between age groups in responses to whether ethnic discrimination still takes place are also marginal. Just over 38% of the youngest category of respondents (ages 18-24) thought this to be the case, compared to 29.1% of those aged 55-64, and 28.5% of those aged 65 and older. This

situation is nearly the same as far as responses to ethnic stereotyping is concerned. Amongst those who are aged 18-24, 36.8% felt that this is the case, 23.9% of those aged 55-64 perceived it to be true, as did and 25.1% of those aged 65 and older.

14.2 TRUST BETWEEN THOSE ON DIFFERENT SIDES OF THE RWANDAN CONFLICT AND GENOCIDE

Figure 22 below presents findings on perceptions relating to trust amongst those who found themselves on different sides of the genocide. The results point to substantial levels of trust between the different groups. More than 92% of adult Rwandans believe that relations have improved between groups that found themselves in opposing camps during the genocide. While almost seventy percent of respondents disagreed with the statement that they or their families found it difficult to trust Rwandans who were at the other end of the conflict, nonetheless, close to one in four (24.7%) agreed with this statement.

As far as the impact of the past on current social relationships is concerned, the data suggests that 78% of of respondents disagreed that Rwanda's past still divides its people, 16 years after the genocide.

Figure 22: Trust between those on different sides of the Rwandan conflict and genocide (% agreement)

Table 13 below examines responses to these statements according to historical population groups. As far as the statement regarding the improvement of social relations since 1994 is concerned, all respondent categories have registered very high levels agreement. Agreement levels with the statement regarding the difficulty that respondents may have to trust those that found themselves on the other side of the genocide divide, are considerably lower, albeit somewhat more disparate. The highest level of agreement came from "genocide survivors" at 37.7%, which is 17 percentage points higher than the national average. On the other side, the lowest level of agreement has been 19.0% amongst "relatives of perpetrators." Affirmative responses to the statement that Rwanda's past still divides its population is equally low and disparate. "Old Case Refugees", with 23,4% registered the highest level of agreement, while those who refused to categorised themselves were the least likely to agree with the statement at 5.7%.

Table 13: Trust between those on different sides of the Rwandan conflict and genocide by social category (%)

Agreement	Genocide survivor	Relative of perpetrator	Tigiste	Old case refugee	New case refugee	Historically marginalised people	Refused	Other
Since 1994, relations have improved between those who found themselves on different sides of the genocide	89.3%	92.3%	97.1%	92.6%	94.2%	87.1%	92.6%	93.0%
It is difficult for me or my family to trust Rwandans who found themselves on the other side of the conflict during the genocide.	37.7%	19.0%	21.2%	34.0%	25.1%	35.5%	24.6%	20.7%
Rwanda's past still divides its people today	20.8%	14.9%	18.2%	23.4%	15.7%	16.1%	5.7%	22.2%
Number of respondents	486	757	34	94	585	31	122	845

*While responses to certain social categories have been included, small numbers of self-identified respondents within those categories prevent meaningful statistical analysis.

14.3 SPONTANEOUS INTER-ETHNIC INTERACTIONS AFTER 1994

Figure 23 below presents data reports on respondents' interactions with people from ethnic groups other than their own. Notably, little data exists on interactions of this kind in the post-genocide period. The highest levels of interaction (83,3%) have been for instances related to material or financial assistance for somebody from another ethnic group, while the lowest frequency recorded was for the receiving of financial or material support from somebody from another ethnic group.

Figure 23: Spontaneous inter-ethnic interactions after 1994 (%)

Opinions on spontaneous inter-ethnic interactions after 1994 show that 73% of males and 75.4% of females often assist those from other ethnic groups, both materially and financially. Further, 70.8% of males and 72.8% of females often receive financial assistance/material support from those from another ethnic group, while 79.9% of males and 81.7% of females indicate that they will often borrow a tool or use a service from someone from a different ethnic group in their communities. An additional 81% of males and 82.8% of females will often lend a tool or give a service to someone from a different ethnic group in their communities.

Figure 24: Spontaneous inter-ethnic interactions after 1994 disaggregated by gender(% agreement)

Table 14 below presents findings for the same statements as those in the previous table, but is disaggregated in terms of responses by the country's different social groups. Furthermore, it only reports on the levels of agreement ("always" or "often"), within each. The overall picture, presented by the data, is one where a generally high level of receptiveness exists for various forms of inter-group contact. The majority of responses register an approval of over 70 percent, with only one being lower than 60%. Generally respondents in each of these groups appeared to be more reticent to give or receive material or financial assistance from other groups. In contrast, the last two categories relating to the borrowing or lending of a tool from somebody from a different group, received higher approval ratings. Since all these percentage are high, it must, however, be emphasised once again that these difference are very relative.

14.4   BEING COMFORTABLE WITH INTER-ETHNIC CONTACT

Sixteen years after the genocide mistrust and fear between members of different ethnic groups seem to have dissipated significantly, as suggested by the data in Figure 24 below. More than 90% of respondents felt comfortable to engage with other groups in a variety of social circumstances, which was virtually impossible in the immediate wake of the genocide. These circumstances included: asking favours from somebody from another ethnic group; having an intimate friend from such a group; joining an association/cooperative of which the majority of members are from another group; joining a political party whose supporters are mostly from another group; or joining a church where the respondent's ethnic group is in a minority. Responses to all these statements overwhelmingly point towards the willingness of Rwandans to engage with each other across historically-defined ethnic lines.

Table 14: Spontaneous inter-ethnic contact by social category (% often/always)

| Often/always	Genocide survivor	Relative of perpetrator	Tigiste	Old case refugee	New case refugee	Hist. marginalised people	Refused	Other
Assist someone from another ethnic group materially or financially	76.5	77.4	66.7	81.9	70.8	64.5	68.9	73.6
Receive financial assistance/material support from someone from another ethnic group	73.5	76.8	75.8	76.6	69.6	54.8	62.3	69.7
Borrow a tool or use a service from someone from a different ethnic group in your community	84.8	83.9	91.2	90.4	76.3	74.2	77.9	78.4
Lend a tool or give a service to someone from a different ethnic group in your community	85.2	85.1	91.2	93.5	77.8	77.4	77.9	80.0
Number of respondents	486	757	34	94	585	31	122	845

*While responses to certain social categories have been included, small numbers of self-identified respondents within those categories prevent meaningful statistical analysis.

Figure 25: Comfortable with inter-ethnic contact (%)

When these responses are disaggregated by gender, 93.8% of males and 94.1% of females feel comfortable asking a favour from a neighbor of a different ethnic group. A further 93.5% of males and 91.6% of females indicated that they feel comfortable having an intimate friend from another ethnic group, while 96% of males and 95.4% of females feel comfortable joining an association or cooperative made up mostly of people from a different ethnic group. Similar percentages of both males and females feel comfortable joining a political party made up mostly of people from a different ethnic group, or joining a church congregation made up mostly of people from a different ethnic group.

Figure 26: Comfortable with inter-ethnic contact disaggregated by gender (% comfortable)

A breakdown of the same responses in terms of age groups, as shown in Table 15 below, indicates that irrespective of their age, a majority of respondents are comfortable in engaging with other groups in the mentioned contexts. Within the sampled population there therefore seems to be little generational variance in the degree of ease with which respondents interact with other groups.

Table 15: Comfortable with inter-ethnic contact occurs by age group (% comfortable)

Comfortable	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65 and older
Asking favour from neighbour of different ethnic group	91.8	94.7	94.6	93.7	94.5	93.0
Having an intimate friend from another ethnic group	90.2	93.0	93.5	93.7	91.4	89.8
Joining association/cooperative made up mostly of people from a different ethnic group	95.3	95.6	96.9	96.0	94.9	93.6
Joining a political party made up mostly of people from a different ethnic group	91.1	91.4	91.1	92.6	91.0	88.2
Joining a church congregation made up mostly of people from a different ethnic group	96.0	96.9	96.6	97.1	95.7	95.2
Number Of Respondents	450	979	652	446	255	187

14.5   APPROVAL OF INTER-ETHNIC INTERACTIONS

Table 16 below presents responses to a further series of statements, probing the extent to which respondents were willing to forge relationships with individuals belonging to ethnic groups other than their own. The data shows that more than 90% of Rwandans approve of interactions between members of different ethnic groups in all of instances that were measured: 98% of respondents indicated that they are willing to work or take orders from someone from another ethnic group; 94% percent approved of marriages across ethnic lines; 96% were open to the idea of owning/operating business with someone from another ethnic group; 98% indicated that they would for someone from another ethnic group; and 97% approved of leaving their child, or the child of a family member, in the care of someone from another ethnic group.

Table 16: Approval of inter-ethnic interactions (%)

	Strongly approve	Approve	Neither	Dissprove	Strongly disapprove
Owning/operating a business with someone from another ethnic group	50.9	45.2	1.5		.4
Working for and taking orders from someone from another ethnic group	50.2	47.9	.6	.5	.1
Voting for someone from another ethnic group	56.2	41.4	1.0	.7	.2
Marrying or having a close relative marry someone from another ethnic group	50.8	43.2	1.8	3.2	.6
Leaving your child, or the child of a family member, in the care of someone from another ethnic group	50.4	46.1	1.0	1.4	.5

As shown in the figure below, almost 96.7% of males and 95.5% of females approve of owning or operating a business with someone from another ethnic group. 98.6% of males and 97.7% of females approve of working for and taking orders from someone from another ethnic group. 97.8% of males and 97.4% of females approve of voting for someone from another ethnic group. 94.6% of males and 93.4% of females approve of marrying or having a close relative marry someone from another ethnic group. 96.8% of males and 96.6% of females approve of leaving their child or a child of a family member in the care of someone from another ethnic group.

Figure 27: Approval of inter-ethnic interactions disaggregated by gender (% approval)

The table below shows that if broken by social category, approval ('approve' and 'strongly approve' combined) remains very high for the same group of engagements. The lowest levels of approval came for inter-ethnic marriages from 'genocide survivors', but at 88.7% agreement to this most intimate level of engagement still remains substantially high.

Table 17: Approval of inter-ethnic interactions disaggregated by social category (% approval)

| Approval	Genocide survivor	Relative of perpetrator	Tigiste	Old case refugee	New case refugee	Historically marginalised people	Refused	Other
Own/operate business with someone from another ethnic group	93.0	96.0	100.0	98.9	96.9	90.3	95.9	97.4
Working for and taking orders from someone from another ethnic group	96.3	98.8	100.0	98.9	98.5	96.8	99.2	98.5
Voting for someone from another ethnic group	92.2	98.8	100.0	97.9	97.9	96.8	98.4	99.3
Marrying or having a close relative marry someone from another ethnic group	88.7	93.0	100.0	92.6	94.4	93.5	96.7	97.2
Leaving your child, or the child of a family member, in the care of someone from another ethnic group	90.3	97.9	100.0	94.7	97.1	96.8	99.2	98.3
Number of respondents	486	757	34	94	585	31	122	845

*While responses to certain social categories have been included, small numbers of self-identified respondents within those categories prevent meaningful statistical analysis.

14.6 PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SOURCES OF DIVISION IN RWANDAN SOCIETY

The last measurement in this section relates to perceptions regarding the most significant divisions in Rwandan society. As shown in Figure 28, the highest percentages of respondents viewed the gap between rich and poor as the biggest division in Rwanda today (30.4%), followed by the division between ethnic groups (22%).

Figure 28: Primary and secondary sources of division in Rwandan society (%)

The results show that economic status, ethnicity and political party membership are being regarded as the three primary sources of division in the country. It is of particular significance here that, in the eyes of ordinary Rwandans, economic inequality (30.4%) surpasses ethnic difference as a source of divisions (22%). Far lower down in the third place is the issue of differences between political parties. The latter has however featured most strongly as the most mentioned secondary source of division, with 15% of respondents mentioning this category. Income inequality, followed by ethnic divisions has been the second and third most mentioned secondary divisions. An interesting aspect of responses to this collection of options is that close to 24% of respondents did not identify a secondary source of division.

14.7   SOCIAL COHESION SUMMARY FINDINGS

This section examined social cohesion as measure of horizontal reconciliation, with the hypothesis that if trust increases between Rwandan citizens, and particularly those on different side of the genocide, reconciliation is more likely to occur.

A descriptive analysis of the RBB data points to significant progress in terms of forging social cohesion in the wake of the genocide in 1994. It suggests a positive shift in inter-ethnic relations and interactions, and a considerable degree of willingness to engage in interactions with people from different ethnic groups. It appears, according to the data, as if this predisposition stems from an increase in trust of people from these different groups. The RBB also indicates that, perhaps contrary to popular belief, that economic cleavages are perceived to be the biggest source of division in Rwanda today. However, about one in five respondents still named ethnicity as the country's primary divide.

The RRB found relatively high levels of social trust and tolerance among respondents, suggesting that overall, there has been progress in achieving horizontal reconciliation in Rwanda. However, the gap between rich and poor, between those of different ethnic groups and between members of political parties, in order of importance, are still perceived as significant sources of division among Rwanda, and this should be a key point of intervention for government, CSOs and the private sector.

XV CONCLUSION

This first Rwandan Reconciliation Barometer (RRB) has been conducted sixteen years after the genocide against the Tutsi and eleven years after the establishment of the NURC. The post-1994 government, together with institutions such as the NURC, has embarked on a process of rebuilding the social fabric which was torn apart by ethnic and regional divisions, which culminated in the genocide. The RRB has investigated perceptions, attitudes and practices of Rwandan citizens in progress in unity and reconciliation.

The tracking of the state of reconciliation in Rwanda was based on six key variables: political culture, human security, citizenship and identity, transitional justice, understanding the past and social cohesion.

Regarding political culture, the findings of the RRB suggest relatively high levels of trust and legitimacy afforded to public institutions and political leadership: these findings suggest positive progress in the reconciliation process. However, work remains in increasing citizen participation in decision-making, and in promoting and cultivating a civil society in which organisations – including political parties, religious institutions, CSOs and the private media – work in the public interest and garner citizen support.

Respondents to the RRB expressed relative confidence in their physical security in the post-conflict period. However, less optimism was detected regarding personal economic prospects and, as also discussed in other sections of this report, many respondents perceive economic inequality to be a growing source of social division within the country.

In respect of citizenship and identity, survey findings suggest that most respondents consider themselves to be proud to be Rwandan. In many respects, the data suggests that national identity has assumed increasing importance over ethnic identity during the post-genocide period. Many respondents also agreed that Rwandans share a distinct set of national values related to reconciliation, which are actively promoted in the actions and behaviour of citizens.

In the post-genocide period, new modes of teaching history have been introduced. Most survey respondents agreed that the ways in which history was previously taught and understood created social divisions, but that today, these new modes of teaching actively encourage reconciliation.

However, it is of significant concern that almost two-fifths of all respondents felt some Rwandans would try to commit genocide again if conditions were favour, although it is against the law.

With regard to transitional justice, a majority of respondents felt that they had experienced individual healing and forgiveness. However, significant percentages also suggested that engagement in reconciliation was not voluntary but rather a necessity dicated by circumstances, and that the attitudes of other citizens still reflected an interest in taking revenge for the events of the past.

In terms of the parties involved in the reconciliation process, many felt this should primarily take place between genocide survivor and perpetrators and between Hutu and Tutsi, although about one-third of respondents indicated that reconciliation is required between "Rwandans and other Rwandans". Results suggest a relatively high degree of approval and confidence in the gacaca system, although somewhat lower levels of satisfaction with efforts to compensate genocide survivors. Overall, many felt they had received justice, and this will likely enhance reconciliation.

Responses related to questions on social cohesion suggest a relatively high degree of support for inter-ethnic relations and interactions across a range of different social circumstances. While ethnicity

is still perceived to be a source of social division in Rwanda, many found economic inequality to be a more significant social divide. Overall, social cohesion appears to be progressing on track.

It is important to emphasise that the results of the first RRB represent baseline measurements. The results therefore present a picture of where Rwanda currently finds itself in terms of national unity and reconciliation. They can however not be used to draw conclusions of trends or progress over time. In order to do this, more such surveys will need to be conducted in future.

RECOMMENDATIONS

I.   Methodological recommendations (lessons learnt)

1. Data collection for the first RRB was conducted in the lead-up to presidential elections, and following highly-publicised accusations between the government, the independent media, and some members of the political opposition. It is likely that these events influenced the views and opinions of RRB respondents to some degree. In order to minimise such potential biases in future, data collection should be carried out during periods that are not characterised by such intensity in the political climate.

2. The RRB questionnaire included a number of sensitive questions which, as discussed previously, not all respondents felt comfortable answering. As such, an exclusively quantitative approach is not sufficient to capture the depth of citizen perceptions on reconciliation. An additional qualitative research component should therefore be included to in future RRB surveys to allow data collectors build more trust with respondents, and encourage them to open up and give their real views. This additional research would have resource implications, which should be considered by NURC when planning for future RRB surveys.

3. As noted previously, local leaders at village level assumed a very active role in selecting survey respondents. This may have introduced a degree of bias, as well as the perception of residents that the RRB was a government-supervised process, and therefore prompting particular responses. The National Institute of Statistics, thanks to the development of Information and Communication Technology in Rwanda, should endeavour to establish and regularly update a nationwide sampling frame (households) to be used by different researchers, which would reduce the possibility of this bias.

4. The RRB instrument has set baseline indicators for future surveys. However, due to changes in the socio-political environment over the time, NURC should endeavour to ensure a regular update of this instrument. This update could help track new indicators emerging from the environment, and drop out those deemed to no longer be of relevance.

II.   Policy-oriented recommendations

1. RRB findings suggested that economic inequality is a significant and growing source of social division in present-day Rwanda. Government efforts to boost economic growth in recent years should go hand-in-hand with work to reduce the gap between rich and poor. Further, anti-poverty initiatives such as the *Girinka Munyarwanda* (One cow one family programme) should be increased by both government and CSOs.

2. Survey results reveal that close to one-third of respondents felt that ethnic discrimination and stereotyping still occurs in Rwanda, although it is prohibited by law. Although it appears that a great deal of progress has been made in improving social relations in the country, more work still remains, particularly regarding the guarantee of equality of access to public goods and services, such as education, employment, and healthcare, for all people in the country.

Further, the NURC must continue to work to combat the use of ethnic prejudice and stereotypes, through existing programmes including Itorero, Ingando, Igorora, and in school curricula. Similar efforts must be made within civil society, for example through religious and community-based organisations, but this may require further work to encourage more trust from citizens.

3. Although to a lesser degree than economic inequality and ethnicity, political parties are still viewed as a source of division within Rwanda, as has been the case in previous stages of the country's history. The perception of conflict between parties has consequences for citizens, and all political parties should commit to abiding the law and actively working to promote unity and reconciliation, irrespective of political differences.

4. In the post-genocide period, many citizens are concerned over access to land and housing, and about 40% of RRB respondents indicated that both have worsened since 1994. About one-third also felt national resources are not equitably distributed. Recommendations that emerge from these findings include continued work on the part of government to enforce and uphold settlement policies, land consolidation and agricultural development. However, in collaboration with the private sector and CSOs, government should also work to promote job creation and non-agricultrual income-generating activities. Collaboration may also be required to ensure delivery of decent housing for citizens, and participants in Ingando, Itorero and Umuganda may also be very useful source of manpower in these efforts. Urban planning and expropriation policy should take into consideration the capacities of different socioprofessional categories, and therefore plan build sites accordingly with clear regulations to abide to.

5. The RRB results suggest that many citizens do not feel they have the ability to actively participate in and influence policy and decision-making process that affect their daily lives. While the RRB and other research suggest strong national performance in governance areas such as fighting corruption, promoting gender equality, and creating a conducive economic environment, greater levels of citizen participation are needed within all levels of government and Parliament, particularly in relation wih the development of new laws and policies.

III. **Further research**

The RRB research methodology is exclusively quantitative and as such, captures data on the current state of reconciliation without yielding in-depth information about the reasons behind these results. Such information should be captured through further qualititative research, which could potentially focus on some of the following issues emerging from the RRB:

- Obstacles to citizen participation in decision-making

- Levels, forms, causes of ethnic discrimination and stereotypes, and strategies to eradicate them.

- Reasons behind lower trust in political parties, religious institutions, and civil society organisations (CSO's).

- Perceptions related to the role of the elite in shaping ethnic conflict in Rwanda, and how reconciliation can be achieved at this level.

Given the broad scope of this baseline research, many other opportunities and focus areas for future research may emerge.

XIV ANNEXES

RWANDA RECONCILIATION BAROMETER

SAMPLING

Selected sectors, cells and villages

Province	District	Sector	Cell/Akagari	Village *Choice*
NORTH	Burera	Bungwe	Mudugari	Mubuga
		Kagogo	Kiringa	Kirigari
		Rwerere	Ruchonsho	Kamatengu
	Gakenke	Busengo	Kamina	Kamina
		Kivuruga	Rugimbu	Mugari
		Rushashi	Mbogo	Gisanze
	Gicumbi	Bukure	Kivumu	Karushya Centre
		Mukarange	Mutarama	Mafunirwa
		Shangasha	Nyabishambi	Gasiza
	Musanze	Busogo	Nyagisozi	Cyasure
		Kinigi	Kampanga	Rubara
		Shingiro	Mudende	Nyarutende
	Rulindo	Base	Gatare	Mugendera 1
		Kisaro	Mubuga	Gako
		Tumba	Misezero	Kavumu
SOUTH	Gisagara	Gikonko	Gikonko	Gahabwa
		Muganza	Remera	Agakurwe
		Save	Rwanza	Akarambo
	Huye	Gishamvu	Ryakibogo	Impinga
		Mbazi	Mwulire	Bumbogo
		Tumba	Gitwa	Nyarurembo
	Kamonyi	Gacurabwenge	Kigembe	Kagarama
		Musambira	Kivumu	Nyarenga
		Runda	Kagina	Gasharara
	Muhanga	Cyeza	Makera	Binunga
		Muhanga	Nyamirama	Namakurwe
		Shyogwe	Mubuga	Matsinsi
	Nyamagabe	Buruhukiro	Kizimyamuriro	Gikungu
		Kibumbwe	Kibibi	Gutandaganya
		Uwinkingi	Mudasomwa	Gicaca
	Nyanza	Busasamana	Kibinja	Ngorongari
		Kigoma	Gahombo	Birembo
		Rwabicuma	Mushirarungu	Kirwa
	Nyaruguru	Busanze	Nteko	Nyarukeri
		Munini	Ngeri	Akagera
		Rusenge	Mariba	Miko
	Ruhango	Bweramana	Murama	Karima
		Kinazi	Kinazi	Nyabinyenga
		Ruhango	Musamo	Ryanyiranda

EST	Bugesera	Gashora	Kagomasi	Kuruganda
		Mwogo	Rugunga	Rukira
		Shyara	Nziranziza	Kagarama
	Gatsibo	Gasange	Teme	Biburankwi
		Kiziguro	Ndatemwa	Akamamesa
		Rwimbogo	Nyamatete	Akajevuba
	Kayonza	Gahini	Kiyenzi	Kabuye
		Murundi	Murundi	Kayongo
		Rwinkwavu	Mukoyoyo	Busasamana
	Kirehe	Gahara	Nyagasenyi	Cyabihama1
		Mahamba	Saruhembe	Gisenyi
		Nyarubuye	Nyabitare	Rugarama
	Ngoma	Gashanda	Munege	Gakuto
		Murama	Mvumba	Mvumba
		Zaza	Ruhembe	Kabeza
	Nyagatare	Gatunda	Nyamirembe	Kajevuba
		Mimuri	Mahoro	Cyabwana
		Tabagwe	Nyabitekeri	Kabeza
	Rwamagana	Fumbwe	Nyamirama	Agatare
		Munyaga	Rweru	Kabingo
		Rubona	Karambi	Karambi
WEST	Karongi	Bwishyura	Kayenzi	Buhoro
		Murambi	Nkoto	Kibamba
		Twumba	Gitabura	Gatare
	Ngororero	Bwira	Gashubi	Rugeshi
		Kavumu	Nyamugeyo	Gatovu
		Sovu	Musenyi	Gihonga
	Nyabihu	Bigogwe	Kora	Kageri
		Kintobo	Nyamugari	Kabagandu
		Shyira	Mpinga	Mukaka
	Nyamasheke	Bushekeri	Ngoma	Keshero
		Karambi	Kabuga	Mugohe
		Shangi	Mugera	Bweranyange
	Rubavu	Bugeshi	Kabumba	Bonde
		Kanzenze	Nyamikongi	Kivugiza
		Rugerero	Muhira	Gatebe 1
	Rusizi	Bugarama	Pera	Kiyovu
		Kamembe	Kamashangi	Amahoro
		Rwimbogo	Mushaka	Gakombe
	Rutsiro	Gihango	Kongo-Nil	Kandahura
		Mukura	Kagusa	Bukeye
		Rusebeya	Remera	Bihira
KIGALI CITY	Gasabo	Bumbogo	Ngara	Birembo
		Kacyiru	Kamutwa	Urugero
		Rutunga	Kabariza	Kabaliza
	Kicukiro	Gahanga	Murinja	Nyamuharaza
		Kanombe	Karama	Byimana
		Nyarugunga	Nonko	Amahoro
	Nyarugenge	Gitega	Kigarama	Umurava
		Mageragere	Ntungamo	Nyabitare
		Rwezamenyo	Rwezamenyo 1	Abatarushwa

RWANDA RECONCILIATION BAROMETER/IGIPIMO CY'UBUMWE N'UBWIYUNGE MU RWANDA

QUESTIONNAIRE TO CITIZENS/ IKAYI Y'IBIBAZO BIGENEWE UMUTURAGE

INTERVIEWER TO FILL IN:

INTERVIEWER NAME: IZINA RY'UBAZA: _____

District (select one)/Akarere:

1	BURERA	11	NYANZA	21	KARONGI
2	GAKENKE	12	NYARUGURU	22	NGORORERO
3	GICUMBI	13	RUHANGO	23	NYABIHU
4	MUSANZE	14	BUGESERA	24	NYAMASHEKE
5	RULINDO	15	GATSIBO	25	RUBAVU
6	GISAGARA	16	KAYONZA	26	RUSIZI
7	HUYE	17	KIREHE	27	RUTSIRO
8	KAMONYI	18	NGOMA	28	GASABO
9	MUHANGA	19	NYAGATARE	29	KICUKIRO
10	NYAMAGABE	20	RWAMAGANA	30	NYARUGENGE

VILLAGE NAME/UMUDUGUDU: _____

CELL NAME/AKAGARI: _____

SECTOR NAME/UMURENGE: _____

QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER/NUMERO Y'IKAYI Y'IBIBAZO: _____

FIELD SUPERVISOR CHECK:

UMWANYA W'UMUGENZUZI W'UBUSHAKASHATSI: _____

Household Selection Procedure. Uko ingo zitoranywa
(See interviewer's instructions book)

INTRODUCTION/KWIMENYEKANISHA:

Good day. My name is _____ and I am an independent researcher working with the Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace in Kigali. We are studying the views of Rwandans on issues of reconciliation, national unity and good governance. We are conducting interviews with Rwandans in all of the thirty districts of this country. Your household was chosen randomly, by chance, and we would like to interview one person. All of the information you give us is completely confidential. This information will be combined with that provided by thousands of other Rwandans. There will be no way to identify your individual answers, so please feel free to tell us what you really think.

Muraho. Nitwa _____ ndi umushakashatsi wigenga ukorera Ikigo cy'ubushakashatsi n'ubusabane bigamije amahoro gifite icyicaro i Kigali. Turakora ubushakashatsi bugamije kumenya icyo abanyarwanda batekereza ku bumwe n'ubwiyunge n'imiyoborere. Ubu bushakashatsi bukorerwa ku banyarwanda mu turere twose tw'u Rwanda. Urugo rwanyu rwatoranyijwe mu buryo bwa tombola kandi turifuza kugirana ikiganiro n'umuntu umwe wo muri uru rugo. Ibyo tuganira ntibizigera bitangazwa kw'izina ryawe, ahubwo bizashyirwa hamwe n'iby'abandi banyarwanda babazwa hatitawe kumazina y'ababitanze, Bityo rero ntugire impungenge zo kutubwiza ukuri ku byo utekereza.

If you feel uncomfortable, you may refuse to answer any question, or end the interview at any time without any negative consequences.

Nihagira ikibazo wumva udashaka gusubiza wacyihorera, nanone uramutse wumvise utagishaka gukomeza gusubiza , ntiwitinye nta ngaruka nimwe byakugiraho.

	Male	Female
Previous interview was with a:	1	2
This interview must be with a:	1	2

INTERVIEWER (Read out): Now, let's begin the interview. First, I would like to start by asking you a few questions about yourself.
Reka noneho dutangire ikiganiro nyirizina. Ndatangira nkubaza ibibazo birebana nawe bwite.

1. How old are you today? [WRITE IN][If respondent is under 18, stop interview and return to selection procedure]
   Ufite imyaka ingahe?

2. Which, if any, of the following religions do you associate yourself with?
   Niba hari idini cg itorero ubamo ni irihe muri aya akurikira?

Roman Catholic Umugatulika	1	Protestant Umuporotestanti	2	Seventh Day Adventist Umudiventi	3	Muslim Umuyisilamu	4
Born again/ Umurokore	5	Other Irindi	6			Refused Yanze	98
Don't know Ntaryo ngira	99						

POLITICAL CULTURE/GOVERNANCE/IMIYOBORERE

TRUST IN PUBILIC INSTITUTIONS/Icyizere mu nzego n'ibigo bya leta

Now, I would like to talk to you about public institutions. Please indicate how much confidence you have in the following institutions in Rwanda. Is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much, or none at all?
Reka noneho tuganire ku nzego n'ibigo bya leta. Kuri buri rwego mu zo ngiye kugusomera wambwira uko icyizere urufitiye kingana. Ese ni cyinshi cyane, cyinshi, ntigihagije, ntacyo namba.

		A great deal cyinshi cyane	Quite a lot cyinshi	Not very much ntigihagije	None at all ntacyo namba	Refused Yanze gusubiza	Don't Know Ntabizi
3.	Parliament Inteko Ishinga Amategeko	4	3	2	1	98	99
4.	The justice system Ubutabera muri rusange	4	3	2	1	98	99
5.	Cabinet Guverinoma/Abaminisitiri	4	3	2	1	98	99
6.	Religious institutions Amadini	4	3	2	1	98	99
7.	Political parties Amashyaka ya politiki	4	3	2	1	98	99
8.	Local authorities Abayobozi b'inzego z'ibanze	4	3	2	1	98	99
9.	Civil society organisations Imiryango n'amashyirahamwe bitari ibya leta	4	3	2	1	98	99
10.	Community policing Inzego z'abaturage zishinzwe umutekano	4	3	2	1	98	99

Now, I would like to talk to you about the media. Please indicate how much confidence you have in each of the following. Is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much, or none at all?
Reka noneho tuvuge ku bitangazamakuru . Wambwira uko ikizere ufitiye buri cyiciro cy'ibitangazamakuru (cy'ibinyamakuru) bikurikira kingana? Ese ni Cyinshi cyane, ni cyinshi, ntigihagije, cyangwa ntacyo namba.

		A great deal cyinshi cyane	Quite a lot cyinshi	Not very much ntigihagije	None at all ntacyo namba	Refused Yanze gusubiza	Don't Know Ntabizi
11.	Public media (print and broadcast) Ibitangazamakuru bya Leta (ibyandika , Radiyo na TV)	4	3	2	1	98	99
12.	Private media (print and broadcast) Ibitangazamakuru byigenga (ibyandika , Radiyo na TV)	4	3	2	1	98	99

13.	In your opinion, how much does the media in Rwanda today contribute to increasing reconciliation? Is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much, or none at all? Kubwawe, wumva itangazamakuru rifite uruhare rungana iki mu guteza imbere ubwiyunge mu Rwanda? Ese ni rwinshi cyane, rwinshi , ntiruhagije , cyangwa ntarwo namba.

A great deal cyinshi cyane	Quite a lot cyinshi	Not very much ntigihagije	None at all ntacyo namba	Refused Yanze gusubiza	Don't Know Ntabizi
4	3	2	1	98	99

TRUST IN LEADERSHIP/ICYIZERE MUBUYOBOZI

Now, I would like to ask you about the political situation. For each of the following statements, please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree.
Mbwira urwego wemeranya n'ibitekerezo ngiye kuvuga hepfo aha, Ese urabyemera cyane, urabyemera, Ntaho uhagaze, ntubyemera, cyangwa ntubyemera na mba.

		Strongly agree Ndabyem era cyane	Agree Ndabyem mera	Neither Ntaho mpagaze	Disagree simbyem era	Strongly disagree Simbyem era na mba	Refused Yanze gusubiza	Don't know Ntabizi
14.	I can trust this country's leaders to do what is in my best interest. Nizera ko abayobozi b'iki gihugu bakora ibiganisha kunyungu zanjye.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
15.	The country's leaders care about all people in Rwanda equally. Abayobozi b'igihugu bita ku bantu bose kimwe.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
16.	I have space and opportunities to influence those that make the laws of the country. Mfite uburyo bwanfasha kugera kubashyiraho amategeko no kuba natuma bashingira kubitekerezo byanjye.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
17.	I have very little say in the important public decisions that affect my life. Nta ruhare rugaragara ngira mubyemezo by'ingenzi bireba imibereho yanjye nk'umunyarwanda.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99

There are a number of ways that citizens can participate to influence the decisions of government. Please indicate which of the following activities you are willing to participate in.

Hari inzira nyinshi abanyarwanda bashobora kunyuramo kugira ngo bagire uruhare mu byemezo bya guverinema. Wambwira, muri ibi bikorwa, icyo wumva wakwitabiira? Umbwire niba ari:Igihe cyose, rimwe na rimwe, cyangwa nta narimwe.

		Always Buri gihe	Only under certain circumstances Rimwe na rimwe	Never Nta na rimwe	Refused Yanze gusubiza	Don't know Ntabizi
18.	Attend a community meeting Kwitabira inama y'aho utuye	3	2	1	98	99
19.	Get together with others to raise an issue Kwishyira hamwe n'abandi ngo mwunvikanishe ikibazo	3	2	1	98	99
20.	Voting in an election Kujya gutora	3	2	1	98	99
21.	Signing a petition Gushyira umukono ku nyandiko rusange ifite icyo isaba ubuyobozi	3	2	1	98	99
22.	Joining a boycott Kwanga kwitabira ibyo utemeranya nabyo	3	2	1	98	99
23.	Participating in a legal protest Kujya mumyigaragambyo yemewe n'amategeko	3	2	1	98	99

HUMAN SECURITY/UMUTEKANO WA MUNTU

Physical Security/KUDAHUTAZWA

Now I would like to ask you about security. For each of the following statements, please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree.

Reka noneho tuganire ibirebana n'umutekano. Mbwira urwego wemeranya n'ibitekerezo ngiye kuvuga hepfo aha. Ese urabyemera cyane, urabyemera, Ntaho uhagaze, ntubyemera, cyangwa ntubyemera na gato.

		Strongly agree Ndabyem era cyane	Agree Ndabyem mera	Neither Ntaho mpagaze	Disagree simbyem era	Strongly disagree Simbyem era na mba	Refused Yanze gusubiza	Don't know Ntabizi
24.	My family and I do not fear any threat to our physical safety. Yaba jye, yaba umuryango wanjye ntacyo dutinya twumva ko cyaduhutaza.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
25.	Overall, I am satisfied with my life today. Muri rusange, nezerejwe n'imibereho mfite muri iki gihe.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
26.	It is unlikely that there will be any armed conflict within Rwandan borders anytime in the next few years. Nta ntambara ishobora kongera kuba kubutaka bw'u Rwanda mu myaka mike iri imbere.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
27.	Rwanda is becoming a safer country to live in. U Rwanda rurarushaho gutekana kuburyo rubereye guturwamo.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99

Now I would like to ask you about expressing your opinion. How comfortable do you feel expressing your true opinion in the following situations? Is it very comfortable, comfortable, neither comfortable nor uncomfortable, uncomfortable or very uncomfortable?
Reka noneho nkubaze ibijyanye n'uburenganzira bwo gutanga ibitekerezo. Wumva ufite umutekano ungana iki mugutanga igitekerezo cyawe nyacyo mu bivugwa hepfo aha. Ese wavuga ko ari mwishi cyane, ari mwinshi, ko ntaho uhagaze, ko ntawo, cyangwa ko ari ntawo na mba.

		Very comfortable Mwinshi cyane	Comfortable Mwinshi	Neither Ntaho mpagaze	Uncomfortable ntawo	Very uncomfortable Ntawo	Refused Yanze gusubiza	Don't know Ntabizi
28.	Expressing your true opinions to your family and close friends Kubwira igitekerezo cyawe nyacyo abavandimwe cyangwa inshuti	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
29.	Expressing your true opinions in public Gutanga igitekerezo cyawe nyacyo mu ruhame	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
30.	Expressing your true opinions to a member of the media Kubwira umunyamakuru igitekerezo cyawe nyacyo	5	4	3	2	1	98	99

Economic security/Umutekano w'umutungo

Now, I would like to ask you about the economic situation. For each of the following statements, please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree.
Noneho ndashaka ko tuganira kubirebana n'umutekano w'ibintu byawe. Mbwira urwego wemeranya n'ibitekerezo bivugwa hepfo aha. Ese urabyemera cyane, urabyemera, ntaho uhagaze, ntubyemera cyangwa ntubyemera na gato.

		Strongly agree Ndabyemera cyane	Agree Ndabyemmera	Neither Ntahompagaze	Disagree simbyemera	Strongly disagree Simbyemera na mba	Refused Yanze gusubiza	Don't know Ntabizi
31.	In Rwanda all people have an equal opportunity to make a living. Mu Rwanda, abantu bose bafite amahirwe angana yo gukora icyababeshaho.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
32.	It is likely that I will lose my house or land in future. Birashoboka ko natakaza cyangwa nabura inzu yanjye, cg isambu mu myaka iri imbere.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
33.	All people benefit equally from government service delivery. Abantu bose bahabwa servisi za leta kuburyo bumwe.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
34.	In Rwanda all people have equal access to land. Mu Rwanda, abantu bose bahabwa amahirwe amwe yo kubona ubutaka.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
35.	National resources are equitably distributed in Rwanda Umutungo w'igihugu/ Ibyiza by'Igihugu bigera ku Bantu bose nta kuryamirana.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99

General security/Umutekano rusange

Please think back on the changes that have happened in Rwanda since 1994. For each of the following statements, would you say that things have improved a great deal, improved, stayed the same, worsened, or worsened a great deal?
Na none, dushubije amaso inyuma, tukareba impinduka zabaye kuva muri 1994, wambwira uko ubona ibivugwa hepfo aha. Ese byateye imbere cyane, byateye imbere , nta cyahindutse, byasubiye inyuma, cyangwa byasubiye inyuma cyane.

		Improved a great deal byateye cyane	Improved byateye imbere	Stayed the same nta cyahindutse	Worsened byasubiye inyuma imbere	Worsened a great deal byasubiye inyuma cyane	Refused Yanze gusubiza	Don't Know Ntabizi
36.	Your personal economic situation Ubukungu bwawe bwite muri rusange	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
37.	Relations between different ethnic groups Imibanire hagati y'amoko	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
38.	Family wellbeing imibereho y'umuryango wawe	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
39.	Relations between people from different regional origins Imibanire hagati y'abantu badaturuka hamwe	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
40.	Employment opportunities Amahirwe yo kubona akazi	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
41.	Access to education Kubona ishuri	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
42.	Your hope for the future Icyizere cyawe cy' ejo hazaza	5	4	3	2	1	98	99

43.	Access to land Kubona ubutaka	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
44.	Access to housing Kubona inzu yo guturamo	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
45.	Security of national borders Umutekano ku mbibi z'u Rwanda	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
46.	The situation of returnees in the country Imibereho y'abahungutse bagaruka mugihugu	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
47.	The gap between rich and poor Icyuho hagati y'abakire n'abakene	5	4	3	2	1	98	99

What about the direction of the country overall? In terms of the following, would you say that the country is going in the right direction or the wrong direction, or are you undecided?

Kubirebana n'aho igihugu kigana muri rusange? Muri ibi bikurikira wavuga ko u Rwanda rugana aheza, rugana ahatariho, cg ntuhabona neza?

		Right direction	Undecided	Wrong direction	Refused	Don't know
48.	National reconciliation in Rwanda Ubwiyunge mu banyarwanda	3	2	1	98	99
49.	Democratic governance in Rwanda Imiyoborere abanyarwanda bafitemo ijambo	3	2	1	98	99

CITIZENSHIP AND IDENTITY / UBWENEGIHUGU n'IBIRANGA ABANTU

National Identity   Ubunyarwanda

Now, I would like to ask you about being a citizen of Rwanda. For each of the following statements, please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree.

Reka none ho nkubaze kubijyanye n'ubunyarwanda. Mbwira urwego wemeranya n'ibitekerezo bivugwa hepfo aha. Ese urabyemera cyane, urabyemera, ntaho uhagaze, ntubyemera cyangwa ntubyemera na gato

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Refused	Don't know
50.	I am proud to be a citizen of Rwanda. Mfite ishema ryo kuba umunyarwanda.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
51.	In Rwanda, all citizens share common national values. Mu Rwanda, abanyarwanda basangiye indangagaciro.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
52.	There are some Rwandans who see themselves as more Rwandan than others. Hari abanyarwanda bumva ko barusha abandi ubunyarwanda.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
53.	Common national values leading to reconciliation are being promoted in Rwanda today. Mu Rwanda Indangagaciro ziganisha ku bumwe n'ubwiyunge ziratezwa imbere.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
54.	Most Rwandans believe that reconciliation is an important national priority. Abanyarwanda hafi ya bose bumva ko ubwiyunge bw'abanyarwanda ari gahunda yihutirwa kandi y'ingenzi mu gihugu.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
55.	In everyday life, the actions and behaviour of most Rwandans promote reconciliation. Mu buzima bwa buri munsi, ibikorwa n'imyitwarire by'abanyarwanda benshi biteza imbere ubwiyunge.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99

Individual Identity/Ibiranga umuntu

Now, I would like to ask you about yourself. For each of the following statements, please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree.
Reka noneho nkubaze kubikureba ubwawe. Mbwira urwego wemeranya n'ibitekerezo bivugwa hepfo aha. Ese urabyemera cyane, urabyemera, ntaho uhagaze, ntubyemera cyangwa ntubyemera na gato.

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Refused	Don't know
56.	I want my children to think of themselves as Rwandans, rather than Hutu, Twa or Tutsis. Nifuza ko abana banjye bajya bibona nk'abanyarwanda aho kwibona nk'abahutu, abatutsi, cyangwa abatwa.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
57.	It is more important to identify oneself as Rwandan, than any other form of identity. Igifite akamaro ni ukwibona nk'umunyarwanda kurusha ibindi byiciro umuntu yakwibonamo.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
58.	Many people identify themselves in numerous different ways. Besides being Rwandan, what other group do you identify with most strongly? What group do you identify with second most strongly? INTERVIEWER: Read response options below aloud. Umuntu agira uburyo bwinshi yibonamo. Uretse kuba uri umunyarwanda, ni ikihe kiciro kindi wiyumvamo kurusha ibindi? Igikurikiraho se ni ikihe? MUSOMERE IBIKURIKIRA							

	Primary Kiza mbere	Secondary Kirakurikira
Those who come from the same region as I do Abo dukomoka(hamwe) mu gace kamwe	1	1
Those who belong to my ethnic group Abo dusangiye ubwoko	2	2
Those who share my religious beliefs Abo duhuje ukwemera (mu iyobokamana)	3	3
Those who share my values Abo dusangiye indangagaciro z'ingenzi	4	4
Those who study or work with me Abo dukorana / twigana	5	5
Those who are of the same gender as I am Ab'igitsina gabo/gore nka njye	6	6
Those who are the same age as I am Urungano	7	7
Other Ikindi	8	8
Refused Yanze	98	98
Don't know Simbizi	99	99

Let's now turn to the question of equality of treatment of all citizens. For each of the following statements, please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree.
Reka noneho turebe niba kubwawe abanyarwanda bafatwa kimwe. Mbwira urwego wemeranya n'ibitekerezo bivugwa hepfo aha. Ese urabyemera cyane, urabyemera, ntaho uhagaze, ntubyemera cyangwa ntubyemera na gato.

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Refused	Don't know
59.	All Rwandans are treated equally by the courts. Abanyarwanda bose bafatwa kimwe imbere y'inkiko.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
60.	All Rwandans have an equal opportunity to get a job within the civil service. Abanyarwanda bose bafite uburenganzira bungana muguhabwa akazi muri leta.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
61.	All Rwandans have an equal opportunity to access public tenders Abanyarwanda bose bafite amahirwe angana muguhabwa amasoko ya leta.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99

UNDERSTANDING THE PAST/GUSOBANUKIRWA AMATEKA

Now, I would like to discuss with you the events that took place in Rwanda in 1994. For each of the following statements, please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree.
Reka none ho tuganire kubyabaye mu Rwanda muri 1994. Mbwira urwego wemeranya n'ibitekerezo bivugwa hepfo aha. Ese urabyemera cyane, urabyemera, ntaho uhagaze, ntubyemera cyangwa ntubyemera na gato.

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Refused	Don't know
62.	Many of Rwanda's conflicts can be blamed on ethnic manipulation. Ibibazo byinshi u Rwanda rufite bishingiye ku myumvire n'imikoreshereze mibi y'amoko.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
63.	Major issues related to conflict between Rwandans have been frankly discussed and understood Ibibazo by'ingenzi birebana n'amakimbirane yabaye mu Rwanda hagati y'abanyarwanda byamaze kuganirwaho neza kandi byumvikanyweho.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
64.	Before the genocide, the way history was taught and understood in Rwanda created divisions in society. Mbere ya jenoside, uko amateka yigishwaga n'uko yumvikanaga byateye amacakubiri mu banyarwanda.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
65.	Conflicts between the elite within the political sphere have been effectively managed. Amakimbirane hagati y'abanyepolitike yamaze gukemurwa neza.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
66.	Today, teaching and understanding of true Rwandan history encourage reconciliation. Muri ikigihe, uko amateka y'u Rwanda yumvikana kandi yigishwa biratanga icyizere cy'ubwiyunge mu banyarwanda.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
67.	Although it is against the law, some Rwandans would try to commit genocide again, if conditions were favouring. Nubwo bitemewe n'amategeko , hari abanyarwanda bashobora kuba bakora indi jenoside iyaba byabashobokeraga.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99

TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE/UBUTABERA BW'INZIBACYUHO

Individual Healing

I would now like to ask you about your personal feelings today. For each of the following statements, please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree.

Reka na none nkubaze kubijyanye n'uko wiyumva. Mbwira urwego wemeranya n'ibitekerezo bivugwa hepfo aha. Ese urabyemera cyane, urabyemera, ntaho uhagaze, ntubyemera cyangwa ntubyemera na gato

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Refused	Don't know
68.	I have forgiven those who hurt others in the past? Namaze kubabarira abahemukiye abandi mu bihe byashize?	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
69.	Many genocide perpetrators have shown remorse for their crimes. Benshi mubakoze jenoside bagaragaje akababaro batewe n'ibyaha bakoze.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
70.	Those who did wrong in the past have sought forgiveness. Abagize nabi mubihe byashize bamaze gusaba imbabazi.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
71.	The attitude of some Rwandans suggests that they still want to take revenge for the events of the past. Hari abanyarwanda baba bagitekereza kwihorera kubera ibyababayeho mu bihe byashize.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
72.	I feel that I have healed from the wounds of the past. Numva naramaze gukira ibikomere natewe n'ibyabaye mu mateka yahise.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
73.	I have no choice but to reconcile with others in my community, or face the consequences. Nta mahitamo mfite, ni kwiyunga cg kwirengera ingaruka zo kutiyunga.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
74.	I personally have experienced reconciliation in my own life. J yewe ubwanjye nabashije kwiyunga.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99

75. Many people agree that reconciliation is important in Rwanda. In your opinion, in Rwanda today, who should be reconciling with whom?

Abantu benshi basanga ko ubwiyunge ari ngombwa mu Rwanda. Kubwawe wumva ari nde ugomba kwiyunga nande?

INTERVIEWER: DO NOT read out responses below. Code first response, then prompt with the following statement:

NTUMUSOMERE IBISUBIZO BIKURIKIRA

Are there any others who should be reconciling?

Abakurikiraho se ni bande?

INTERVIEWER: Code second response.

		Primary	Secondary
	Rwandans and other Rwandans Abanyarwanda hagati yabo	1	1
	Genocide perpetrators and genocide survivors Abakoze jenoside hamwe n'abacitse ku icumu rya jenoside	2	2
	Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups Abahutu n'Abatutsi	3	3
	Civil society organisations and citizens Imiryango itegamiye kuri leta hamwe n'abanyarwanda	4	4
	Old case refugees and other Rwandans Abahungutse ba 1959 hamwe n'abandi banyarwanda	5	5

Citizens and leaders Abayoborwa n'abayobora		6	6
Leaders between themselves Abayobozi hagati yabo		7	7
Rwandan government and the international community Ubuyobozi bw'u Rwanda hamwe n' Amahanga		8	8
Other Abandi		9	9
Refused Yanze		98	98
Don't Know Simbizi		99	99

Justice/Ubutabera

As you know, one of the main ways that Rwandans pursued justice and reconciliation after the genocide was through gacaca courts. I would now like to ask you about your opinion of the gacaca courts. For each of the following statements, please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree.
Nk'uko mubizi, bumwe mu buryo bukomeye abanyarwanda bakoresheje bagana ku butabera n'ubwiyunge ni Inkiko Gacaca. Ndifuza kukubaza icyo utekereza ku nkiko gacaca. Mbwira urwego wemeranya n'ibitekerezo bivugwa hepfo aha: mbwira niba ubyemera cyane, ubyemera, ntaho uhagaze, utabyemera, cyangwa utabyemera na gato.

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Refused	Don't know
76. The truth about the genocide in Rwanda, as it really happened, was revealed through gacaca courts. Ukuri nyako kubyabaye muri jenoside kwabashije kumenyekana kubera inkiko Gacaca.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
77. Inyangamugayo were impartial in the gacaca process. Mu guca imanza, Inyangamugayo z'Inkiko Gacaca ntizabogamye (zararasamaga).	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
78. Those who were convicted through gacaca received fair punishment. Abagize uruhare muri Jenoside babonye ibihano bikwiriye.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
79. Those convicted through gacaca who have served their sentences have been successfully reintegrated into Rwandan society. Abakatiwe na gacaca bakarangiza ibihano byabo bashoboye gusubira mubuzima busanzwe muburyo bukwiye.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99

Now I would like to ask you about some of the other initiatives and efforts to bring about justice and reconciliation in Rwanda. For each of the following statements, please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree.
Reka nkubaze kubirebana n'ibindi bikorwa /gahunda zigamije kuzana ubutabera n'ubwiyunge mu Rwanda. Mbwira urwego wemeranya n'ibitekerezo bivugwa hepfo aha, mbwira uti:Ndabyemera cyane, Ndabyemera, Ntaho mpagaze, Ndabihakanye, mbihakanye nivuye inyuma.

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Refused	Don't know
80. Genocide survivors have been compensated for the crimes committed against them. Abacitse ku icumu rya jenoside bahawe indishyi kubera ibyaha bakorewe.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99

81.	Genocide will never occur again in Rwanda, because the underlying causes have been dealt with. Nta jenoside izongera kuba mu Rwanda kuko Impamvu za yiteje zitakiriho.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
82.	Survivors of the genocide have received enough support and assistance from government. Leta yahaye abacitse ku icumu rya jenoside inkunga zihagije.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
83.	Those whose properties/assets had been abusively taken from them (1959 and 1994) have recovered them. Imitungo yari yarabohojwe yasubijwe ba nyirayo yose.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
84.	Land redistribution after 1994 has lowered land related issues. Isaranganya ry'amasambu ryagabanyije ibibazo bishingiye ku butaka.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
85.	Land redistribution after 1994 impacted positively social cohesion. Isaranganya ry'amasambu ryateje imbere imibanire myiza mu baturage.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99

Please tell me your impressions of the effectiveness of each of the following. Are they very effective, effective, neither effective nor ineffective, ineffective, or very ineffective?
Mbwira uko ubona imikorere y'Urukiko mpuzamahanga rwashyiriweho u Rwanda ruba Arusha (Tanzania) Ese ni myiza cyane, myiza, ntaho uhagaze, mibi, mibi cyane?

	Very effective	Effective	neither	Ineffective	Very ineffective	Refused	Don't know
The International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda Imikorere y'Urukiko mpuzamahanga mpanabyaha rwashyiriweho u Rwanda, (ruri Arusha).	5	4	3	2	1	98	99

SOCIAL COHESION/IMIBANIRE

In the past, many Rwandans experienced discrimination and prejudice on the basis of their ethnic origins. After the genocide Rwandans agreed that this should never happen again. We would like find out what progress we have made as a country in this regard. For each of the following statements, please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree.
Mu bihe byashize, abanyarwanda benshi bagiye bagirirwa ivangura rishingiye ku bwoko. Nyuma ya jenoside, abanyarwanda bumvikanye ko ibi bitagomba kuzongera kubaho ukundi muri iki gihugu. Turifuza kumenya intambwe u Rwanda rwateye muri uru rwego. Muri ibi bikurikira mbwira niba ubyemera cyane, ubyemera, ntaho uhagaze, utabyemera, cyangwa utabyemera na gato.

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Refused	Don't know
86.	I have never experienced ethnic prejudice in Rwanda since the end of the genocide. Kuva jenoside yarangira ntavangura rishingiye ku ubwoko ndakorerwa.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
87.	Although ethnic discrimination Is banned in Rwanda, it still occurs. Nubwo ivangura rishingiye ku ubwoko ribujijwe mu Rwanda, riracyaboneka.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
88.	Rwandans still judge each other on the basis of ethnic stereotypes. Abanyarwanda baracyareberana mu ndorerwamo z'ubwoko.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99

Since 1994, some social relationships in Rwanda may have changed. Thinking about the present time, how often do you do each of the following? Is it always, often, sometimes, rarely or never?

Kuva muri 1994, hari imwe mu imibanire hagati y'abanyarwanda ishobora kuba yarahindutse. Muri iki gihe cya none, ni kangahe ukora ibi bikurikira? Ni buri gihe, kenshi, rimwe na rimwe, gake cyane, nta na rimwe?

		Always	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never	Refused	Don't know
89.	Assist someone from another ethnic group materially or financially. Guha umuntu mudahuje ubwoko inkunga/intwererano y'igikoresho cyangwa amafaranga.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
90.	Receive financial assistance or material support from someone from another ethnic group. Kwakira inkunga/intwererano y'igikoresho cg amafaranga uyihawe n'umuntu mudahuje ubwoko.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
91.	Borrow a tool or use a service from someone from a different ethnic group in your community. Gutira igikoresho cg gusaba servise ku muntu mudahuje ubwoko mu gace utuyemo.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
92.	Lend a tool or give a service to someone from a different ethnic group in your community. Gutiza igikoresho cg guha servise umuntu mudahuje ubwoko mugace utuyemo.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99

After the genocide, Rwandans from different sides of the conflict had to learn to trust one another. Thinking about Rwanda today, to what extent would you agree with the following statements? Do you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree?

Nyuma ya jenoside, abanyarwanda bo muruhande rwiciwe no m'uruhande rw'abicaga bagombaga kwiga kwongera kwizerana. Murebye aho tugeze muri iyi minsi, ku byo ngiye kugusomera, mbwira niba ubyemera cyane, ubyemera , ntaho uhagaze, utabyemera, utabyemera na gato.

		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Refused	Don't know
93.	Since 1994, relations have improved between those who found themselves on different sides of the genocide. Kuva nyuma ya jenoside ya 1994, imibanire hagati y'uruhande rw'abahigwaga n'urwabahigaga imaze gutera imbere.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
94.	It is difficult for me or my family to trust Rwandans who found themselves on the other side of the conflict during the genocide. Biragoye haba kuri njye cg umuryango wanjye kugira ngo twizere bariya tutari ku ruhande rumwe igihe cya jenoside.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
95.	Rwanda's past still divides its people today. Amateka y'u Rwanda aracya tandukanya abanyarwanda.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99

How comfortable would you feel in the following situations? Would you feel very comfortable, comfortable, neither comfortable nor uncomfortable, uncomfortable or very uncomfortable?

Wumva waba ufite umutekano ungana ute mugukora ibi ngiye kugusomera. Ese ubona umutekano wawe waba ari mwinshi cyane, mwinshi, ntaho uhagaze, muke, muke cyane.

		Very comfortable	Comfortable	Neither	Uncomfortable	Very uncomfortable	Refused	Don't know
96.	Asking a favour from a neighbour of a different ethnic group. Gusaba umuturanyi mudahuje ubwoko kugira icyo agufasha.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
97.	Having an intimate friend from another ethnic group. Kugira inshuti magara yo mu bundi bwoko.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
98.	Joining an association/ cooperative made up mostly of people from a different ethnic group. Kujya mw'ishyirahamwe/ umuryango wiganjemo abo mudahuje ubwoko.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
99.	Joining a political party made up mostly of people from a different ethnic group. Kujya mw'ishyaka rigizwe n'abanyamuryango benshi bava mu bundi bwoko.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
100.	Joining a church congregation made up mostly of people from a different ethnic group. Kujya mw'idini/itorero rigizwe n'abayoboke benshi bava mu bundi bwoko.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99

To what extent would you approve the following situations? Would you strongly approve, approve, neither approve nor disapprove, disapprove, or disapprove strongly?
Ibi bikurikira ubyemera ku gipimo kingana iki? Ese urabyemera cyane, urabyemera, ntaho uhagaze, ntubyemera, cyangwa ntubyemera na mba?

		Strongly	Approve	Neither	Disapprove	Strongly disapprove	Refused	Don't know
101.	Owning and operating a business with someone from another ethnic group. Gufatanya ubucuruzi n'umuntu wo mubundi bwoko.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
102.	Working for and taking instructions from someone from another ethnic group Gukorera umuntu cg gutegekwa n'umuntu wo mu bundi bwoko.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
103.	Voting for someone from another ethnic group. Gutora umuntu mudahuje ubwoko.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
104.	Marrying or having a close relative marry someone from another ethnic group. Gushaka umufasha (umugore/umugabo) cg kugira umuvandimwe washaka umufasha mudahuje ubwoko.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99
105.	Leaving my child, or the child of a family member, in the care of someone from another ethnic group. Gusiga umwana wawe cg uw'umuvandimwe wawe ku muturanyi/umuntu mudahuje ubwoko.	5	4	3	2	1	98	99

To what extent do you agree with the following statement? Do you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree?

Wambwira niba wemera cyane, wemera, ntaho uhagaze, utemera cyangwa utemera na gato ibi bikurikira?

106.	In Rwanda, all groups enjoy equal rights. *Mu Rwanda abantu b'ibyiciro byose bafite uburenganzira bungana.*	5	4	3	2	1	98	99

107.	In your opinion, what is the biggest division in Rwanda today, if any? Apart from this one, what would you say is the second biggest division in Rwanda today? *Kubwawe usanga ari iki gitandukanya abanyarwanda kurusha ibindi?* *Ubona icya kabiri ari ikihe?* INTERVIEWER: Code first mention and second mention. *Andika icya mbere mu mwanya wacyo n'icya kabiri mu mwanya wacyo*

	First mention	Second mention
The division between rich and poor *Icyuho hagati y'abakire n'abakene*	1	1
The division between those of different ethnic groups *Amoko*	2	2
The division between members of different religions *Amadini*	3	3
The division between those of different linguistic backgrounds *Indimi*	4	4
The division between supporters of different political parties *Amashyaka ya politiki*	5	5
The division between different regions *Amacakubiri ashingiye aho umuntu aturuka*	6	6
Other *Ikindi*	7	7
No division *Nta na kimwe*	8	8
Refused *Yanze*	98	98
Don't know *Ntabizi*	99	99

We are now coming to the end of our interview. I would just like to ask you a few more questions about yourself.

Ubu turi hafi yo gusoza ikiganiro cyacu. Gusa ndifuza kukubaza utundi tubazo dukeya.

108.	What is the highest level of education you received? *Ni ikihe cyiciro cya nyuma cy'amashuri wize?*

None *Ntayo*	Primary *Abanza*	Some secondary *Sinarangije ayisumbuye*	Completed secondary *Narangije ayisumbuye*	Vocational *Ay'imyuga*	Tertiary *Amakuru*	Refused *Yanze*
1	2	3	4	5	6	98

109.	How would you describe your current employment status?
Unemployed, not looking for work *Nta kazi, nta n'ako nshaka*	1
Unemployed, looking for work *Ndigushakisha akazi*	2
Employed in the formal sector *Akazi gahamye*	3

Employed in the informal sector Akazi ko kwirwanaho	4
Self-employed Ndikorera	5
Agricultural worker Umuhinzi-mworoz	6
Retired Ndi mu kiruhuko cy'izabukuru	7
Unable to work/disabled Naramugaye	8
Housewife Umugore wo murugo	9
Student Umunyeshuri	10
Refused Yanze	98

110.	In which of the following categories do you find yourself most? Muri ibi byiciro by'abanyarwanda ni ikihe wibonamo kurusha ibindi?	
	Genocide survivors Abarokotse jenoside	1
	Relatives of genocide suspects/perpetrators Abavandimwe b'abakekwaho jenoside cyangwa abahamwe n'icyaha cya jenoside	2
	Tigistes Uwakoze/ukora igihano nsimburagifungo	3
	Old case refugees (1959) Impunzi za kera zatahutse, zarizarahunze 1959	4
	New case refugees (1994 and after) Impunzi za vuba zatahutse, zari zarahunze 1994 cg nyuma y'aho	5
	Historically marginalised people Abasigajwe inyuma n'amateka	6
	Refused Yanze	98
	Other Ikindi (Utarahunze kandi utarishe, udafite umuvandimwe uregwa genocide, utari umucikacumu)	99

Have you ever attended any of the following programme conducted by NURC
Wigeze ujya muri gahunda zikurikira zitegurwa na Komisiyo y'Ubumwe n'Ubwiyunge?

		Yes	No
111.	INGANDO	1	2
112.	ITORERO	1	2